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Theses
•	 The	 economic	 cooperation	 between	 Germany	 and	 Central	 Europe	 has	
brought	mutual	benefits	in	recent	years.	Since	1989,	Germany	has	become	
the	most	important	trading	and	investment	partner	for	the	V4	states,	which	
has	had	significant	impact	on	the	evolution	of	the	economic	model	of	Cen-
tral	Europe,	and	helped	in	the	process	of	modernising	the	region.	German	
companies	from	the	automotive,	financial	and	energy	sectors,	among	oth-
ers,	have	gained	significant	market	shares	in	those	countries.	The	develop-
ment	of	economic	links	between	Germany	and	the	V4	states	has	also	been	
beneficial	 for	Germany	 itself.	Taken	 together,	 the	Visegrad	Group	 states	
have	become	Germany’s	most	important	global	partner	both	in	exports	and	
imports.	They	have	managed	–	as	some	of	the	few	states	without	any	sig-
nificant	resources	of	raw	materials	–	to	maintain	relatively	balanced	trade	
relations,	showing	surpluses	or	minor	deficits	in	their	trade	with	Germany.	
•	 Over	the	last	decade,	Central	Europe	has	become	an	important	source	for	
improving	 the	 international	 competitiveness	 of	 the	 German	 economy.	
Firstly,	moving	factories	from	Germany	to	V4	became	an	element	of	lower-
ing	production	costs	for	many	German	companies.	The	pressure	business	
exerted	on	German	workers	to	reduce	labour	costs	was	also	an	important	
element.	Secondly,	 in	 the	 face	of	major	problems	caused	by	a	 lack	of	 en-
gineers,	German	businesses	moved	part	of	their	R&D	activities	to	Central	
Europe,	or	attracted	qualified	workers	from	the	region	to	Germany.
•	 The	economic	cooperation	between	Germany	and	Central	Europe	has	been	
boosted	 by	 investments	financed	 from	European	Union	 funds.	Germany	
has	been	by	far	the	largest	beneficiary	of	investments	in	the	V4	states	from	
the	EU’s	cohesion	policy.	Thanks	to	this,	Germany	has	been	able	to	rely	on	
additional	exports	to	these	countries,	to	the	tune	of	€30	billion	in	the	pe-
riod	2004-151.	Germany	has	benefited	not	only	directly,	from	the	contracts	
it	acquired,	but	also	indirectly;	a	significant	proportion	of	these	funds	has	
been	spent	on	infrastructure,	which	has	made	it	easier	to	transport	goods	
between	Germany	and	Central	&	Eastern	Europe.	
1	 Assessment	of	the	benefits	obtained	by	the	EU-15	member	states	as	a	result	of	the	implemen-
tation	of	the	cohesion	policy	in	the	countries	of	the	Visegrad	Group.	Final	report.	The	Struc-
tural	Research	Institute.	London,	December	2011;	http://ibs.org.pl/app/uploads/2015/12/Oce-
na-korzy%C5%9Bci-uzyskiwanych-przez-pa%C5%84stwa-UE-15-w-wyniku-realizacji-poli-
tyki-sp%C3%B3jno%C5%9Bci-w-krajach-Grupy-Wyszehradzkiej.pdf
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•	 Over	recent	years	the	V4	countries	have	proved	able	to	produce	parts	and	
goods	for	German	companies	in	an	efficient	manner.	In	recent	years,	the	
automotive,	 electro-mechanical,	 electricity	 and	 retail	 trade	 sectors	 have	
significantly	 increased	 their	 expansion	 in	Central	Europe.	 It	 is	 expected	
that	German	companies	will	move	these	R&D	activities	to	Central	Europe,	
which	would	be	impossible	to	conduct	in	Germany,	for	example	due	to	a	lack	
of	engineers.	However,	this	process	will	probably	not	be	very	large	in	scale.
•	 One	condition	for	the	V4	states	to	achieve	levels	of	trade	cooperation	with	
Germany	on	the	level	of	countries	such	as	Austria,	Belgium,	the	Netherlands	
or	Switzerland	is	that	they	should	be	able	to	sell	German	companies	their	
own	products,	with	high	added	value.	There	is	still	great	potential	to	deepen	
economic	cooperation	between	Germany	and	the	V4	countries.	In	addition	
to	the	traditional	advantages	of	Central	Europe,	such	as	geographical	prox-
imity,	traditions	of	industrial	production,	low	labour	costs,	and	reliability	
&	 security	 of	 supply,	German	 companies	 appreciate	 the	 new	 elements	 of	
competitiveness	 in	 the	 region,	 such	 as	 the	 stability	 of	 economic	develop-
ment	and	political-institutional	conditions,	ever	better	infrastructure,	and	
the	high	levels	of	the	local	workers’	qualifications	and	productivity.	
•	 Central	Europe’s	great	dependence	on	German	trade	and	investment	poses	
a	number	of	risks	for	the	region’s	economic	development.	First,	Germany	
specialises	in	exporting	capital	goods	based	on	traditional	industrial	com-
panies.	German	companies	have	still	not	shown	any	significant	successes	
in	the	IT	sector,	which	may	determine	the	strength	of	the	economy	in	the	
future.	Secondly,	the	role	of	Central	Europe	as	an	assembly	plant	for	Ger-
man	companies	is	linked	in	the	medium	term	with	the	risk	of	losing	that	
position	to	countries	with	lower	production	costs.	In	addition,	the	sale	of	
products	from	Central	Europe	under	the	brand	names	of	German	compa-
nies	does	not	help	in	making	their	own,	globally	recognisable	brands;	it	is	
thus	difficult	 to	make	significant	margins	and	escape	 from	the	 so-called	
middle	income	trap.
•	 The	 current	 period	 of	 global	 political	 and	 economic	 instability	 has	 in-
creased	the	importance	of	Central	Europe	for	Germany.	Firstly,	the	region’s	
geographical	proximity	ensures	that	this	economic	cooperation	will	not	be	
disturbed	by	geopolitical	problems,	and	there	is	no	risk	that	the	continuity	
of	supply	will	be	interrupted.	Secondly,	due	to	the	euro	crisis,	the	dispute	
over	the	future	shape	of	the	EU’s	economic	policy	has	intensified.	Germany	
needs	allies	who	will	promote	a	free-market	model	of	the	Union,	based	on	
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the	principles	of	fiscal	discipline,	in	the	clash	with	the	more	statist	vision	of	
the	EU	represented	by	France,	but	probably	also	by	leftist-ruled	Greece	and	
Portugal,	and	also	perhaps	Spain.	
•	 In	the	coming	years,	Germany	may	become	interested	in	bringing	Central	
Europe	over	to	its	side	in	a	variety	of	disputes,	such	as	the	reform	of	the	
euro-zone,	the	revision	of	the	EU’s	climate	and	energy	policy,	and	also	the	
problems	in	the	EU’s	eastern	and	southern	neighbourhoods.	So	far,	despite	
the	dynamically	developing	economic	cooperation	in	recent	years,	Germa-
ny	does	not	appear	to	show	any	particular	interest	in	deepening	its	political	
cooperation	with	Central	Europe.	Enhanced	cooperation	within	the	frame-
work	of	the	V4	may	help	Germany	to	become	more	sensitive	to	the	region’s	
interests,	especially	as	 it	seems	possible	that	Berlin	can	reach	a	common	
position	with	the	V4	on	many	EU	issues.
•	 An	 important	prerequisite	 for	 improving	 cooperation	between	Germany	
and	Central	 Europe	 is	 to	 inform	German	public	 opinion,	 through	 inten-
sive	promotional	activities,	about	the	significant	scale	of	their	mutual	eco-
nomic	ties.	Germany’s	dynamically	deepening	cooperation	has	passed	the	
German	media	by,	in	contrast	to	their	considerable	number	of	reports	and	
analysis	on	the	development	of	economic	relations	with	the	BRIC	countries.	
This	also	stems	 from	German	economists’	 lack	of	 interest	 in	Central	Eu-
rope.	After	the	accession	of	the	countries	of	the	region	to	the	EU,	the	in-
terest	areas	of	many	scientific	centres	shifted	further	eastwards.	German	
political	institutions	are	conducting	only	small	amounts	of	analytical	work	
in	the	area	of	Central	Europe.	This	leads	to	misunderstandings	of	the	situ-
ation	in	the	region,	and	to	an	incorrect	narrative	stating	that	funding	from	
the	 cohesion	policy	 is	 only	a	way	of	financing	 the	poorer	member	 states	
which	does	not	guarantee	Germany	any	economic	benefits.	
•	 The	 effects	 of	 the	 possible	 breakup	 of	 the	 Schengen	 area	 are	 difficult	 to	
quantify.	 An	 increased	 bureaucratic	 burden	 on	 the	 movement	 of	 goods	
between	Germany	and	V4	would	certainly	impede	trade	and	generate	ad-
ditional	costs.	It	would	likely	be	a	big	problem	for	the	German	automotive	
and	logistics	sectors,	in	which	time	of	delivery	plays	an	important	role	in	
competitiveness.	For	this	reason,	it	can	also	be	expected	that	German	com-
panies	involved	in	Central	Europe	will	oppose	stricter	border	controls.
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InTroducTIon
Many	experts	interpreted	the	accession	of	the	Czech	Republic,	Hungary,	Slo-
vakia	and	Poland	to	the	European	Union	as	the	‘end	of	history’	in	their	econom-
ic	relations	with	 the	Germany.	Since	2004	 there	have	been	 few	comparative	
studies	on	the	development	of	economic	relations	between	Germany	and	Cen-
tral	Europe.	The	following	report	is	intended	to	fill	this	gap,	and	its	purpose	is	
to	answer	the	question	of	how	economic	relations	between	Germany	and	the	
countries	of	the	Visegrad	Group	(V4)	have	changed	in	the	light	of	the	significant	
political	and	economic	changes	within	the	European	Union	over	recent	years.	
The	Czech	Republic,	Poland,	Slovakia	and	Hungary	have	been	selected	as	ex-
amples	of	the	general	changes	in	the	links	between	Germany	and	Central	Eu-
rope,	which	have	also	affected	Germany’s	relationships	with	other	countries	
in	the	region,	such	as	Bulgaria,	Romania	and	the	Baltic	states.	From	the	per-
spective	of	Germany’s	business	elites,	the	countries	of	the	region	are	linked	by	
many	similarities,	such	as	the	following:
•	 geographical	proximity	and	cultural	similarity;
•	 uniform	market	rules	which	apply	throughout	the	EU;
•	 long-standing	industrial	traditions,	and	the	substantial	participation	of	in-
dustrial	production	in	their	GDPs;
•	 the	significant	share	of	foreign	capital	in	their	manufacturing	and	finan-
cial	sectors;
•	 an	economic	model	based	on	exports,	with	the	significant	participation	of	
foreign	companies;
•	 small	 or	 insignificant	 raw	material	 resources,	 and	 great	 dependence	 on	
their	import;
•	 energy	systems	based	on	power	plants	which	use	coal	and	nuclear	energy,	
fuels	which	are	increasingly	being	displaced	from	the	EU;
•	 significant	resources	of	skilled	workers	with	lower	wage	expectations	than	
their	counterparts	in	Western	Europe;
•	 relatively	good	economic	performances	against	the	backdrop	of	the	EU	as	
a	whole	during	the	global	financial	crisis	and	the	crisis	within	the	euro-
zone.
Germany	 is	 Central	 Europe’s	 most	 important	 economic	 partner,	 and	 in	 re-
cent	 years	 this	 link	 has	 brought	 forth	mutual	 economic	 benefits.	 However,	
it	 is	worth	considering	the	stability	of	the	economic	model	that	has	evolved,	
and	also	asking	how	the	close	economic	cooperation	between	the	V4	states	and	
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Germany	may	be	used	to	increase	the	level	of	innovation.	The	problem	of	the	
capacity	to	design	and	manufacture	modern	goods	and	services	 is	becoming	
more	important	in	the	debate	within	Central	Europe	on	the	so-called	‘middle	
income	trap’.	This	is	defined	as	a	risk	of	exhausting	existing	engines	of	growth,	
and	the	inability	to	transition	from	a	production	model	based	on	low	labour	
costs	to	one	based	on	quality	and	innovation,	resulting	in	higher	wages.
Three	 sources	of	 information	were	used	 in	preparing	 this	 report.	The	main	
methodology	applied	in	the	study	was	the	analysis	of	economic	indicators	in	
trade	and	investment	between	Germany	and	the	V4	countries.	In	addition,	the	
study	was	based	on	conversations	with	about	30	experts,	mostly	from	Germa-
ny	but	also	the	V4	states:	representatives	of	German	ministries	at	the	federal	
and	regional	 (Länder)	 levels,	 as	well	as	embassies,	business	associations,	 re-
search	institutes,	chambers	of	commerce	and	foreign	investment	agencies	in	
the	Czech	Republic,	Poland,	Hungary	and	Slovakia.	This	information	has	been	
supplemented	 by	 case	 studies	 from	 the	most	 important	German	 industries,	
with	an	analysis	of	their	situation	in	the	V4	states.
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I. The advanTages of cenTral europe  
from The perspecTIve of germany
In	 recent	 years,	 the	 region	 of	 Central	 Europe	 has	 continued	 its	 quite	 rapid	
growth,	 and	 it	has	dealt	 relatively	well	with	 the	global	 economic	downturn	
post-2009,	especially	when	considering	the	situation	in	the	euro-zone	as	a	ref-
erence	point.	Its	stronger	economic	position,	along	with	the	change	in	political	
conditions	in	Europe,	makes	it	an	even	more	attractive	partner	for	Germany	
than	before.	
From	 the	German	point	 of	 view,	 the	 region	of	Central	Europe	has	 since	 the	
1990s	displayed	a	number	of	common	features.	The	basic	characteristics	of	the	
V4	countries’	economies	–	such	as	their	industrial	traditions,	low	labour	costs,	
cultural	and	geographic	proximity,	and	a	skilled	workforce	–	made	them	an	
ideal	area	for	the	expansion	of	trade	and	investment.	From	the	outset,	Germa-
ny	involved	itself	in	the	economic	transition	process	in	the	countries	of	Cen-
tral	Europe,	perceiving	an	opportunity	to	gain	political,	economic	and	security	
benefits.	Germany’s	goal	was	to	establish	strong	relationships	with	Central	Eu-
rope,	to	link	it	politically	with	Western	structures,	and	build	up	an	economic	
hinterland	for	itself	in	the	region.
Central	Europe’s	economic	importance	for	Germany	has	risen	in	recent	years,	
as	the	high	efficiency	of	the	businesses	located	in	the	region	has	helped	the	
most	important	branches	of	the	German	economy	to	keep	their	output	com-
petitive	during	the	global	economic	downturn.	Thanks	to	its	relatively	 low	
wages	and	high	productivity,	Central	Europe	has	become	a	factory	for	Ger-
man	products	on	the	EU	market	whose	production	could	not	have	been	moved	
to	 Asia.	 After	 entering	 the	 euro-zone,	 Germany’s	 economic	 situation	 was	
evaluated	very	critically	both	at	home	and	abroad.	The	economy	remained	
stagnant	 for	 several	 years	 after	 German	 reunification.	 Unemployment	 in	
Germany	 between	 1991	 and	 2001,	 especially	 in	 the	 new	 Länder,	 remained	
at	a	high	level	of	around	20%;	public	debt	rose,	and	the	country’s	exchange	
payments	deficit	with	other	countries	remained	high.	Germany,	along	with	
France,	was	the	first	to	break	the	rules	on	the	budget	deficit	in	the	euro-zone.	
In	response	to	the	diagnosis	of	economists	who	blamed	Germany’s	problems	
on	 its	 overly	 high	 labour	 costs,	 the	 government	 in	 Berlin	 introduced	 a	 re-
form	package	in	2003-5	called	Agenda	2010,	limiting	social	benefits,	improv-
ing	business	conditions	and	making	the	labour	market	more	flexible.	Under	
pressure	from	these	reforms,	as	well	as	the	threat	by	German	companies	that	
they	would	transfer	jobs	to	the	countries	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	the	
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German	trade	unions	lowered	their	wage	demands,	focusing	on	keeping	their	
plants	in	Germany	running.	More	savings	were	generated	by	moving	part	of	
the	production	from	Germany	to	countries	with	lower	labour	costs	–	that	is,	
countries	in	Asia	and	Central	Europe.	
The	central	European	states	have	become	an	important	production	centre	on	
the	EU	market.	They	have	become	an	attractive	place	to	invest	capital,	espe-
cially	 for	German	small-	and	medium-sized	businesses,	because	after	 they	
entered	the	EU	their	 legislation	was	already	close	to	German	tax	laws,	and	
their	standards	of	legal	protection	were	higher	than	those	of	other	emerging	
economies.	For	these	reasons,	investment	in	Central	Europe	was	also	easier	
for	the	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises	sector,	which	is	strong	in	Ger-
many.	Moreover,	some	bulky	goods	destined	for	the	European	market,	such	
as	 cars	 or	machinery,	were	 not	worth	 producing	 in	 Asia	 due	 to	 transport	
costs.	It	is	noteworthy	that	since	2009,	German	automotive	companies	have	
built	up	their	production	capacity	in	Central	Europe	in	order	to	generate	sav-
ings.	The	source	of	these	savings	was	no	longer	labour	costs	alone,	which	had	
risen	 considerably	 in	 previous	 years,	 but	 also	 increased	 efficiency	 thanks	
to	the	factories’	high	productivity	and	the	improving	qualifications	of	local	
workers.	
In	 recent	 years,	 the	 favourable	 economic	 situation	 of	 the	 central	 European	
countries	continued,	which	increased	their	attractiveness	as	a	marketing	part-
ner	for	Germany	against	the	background	of	an	increasingly	difficult	global	eco-
nomic	situation.	The	Visegrad	Group’s	member	states	have	been	able	to	main-
tain	a	high	rate	of	economic	development.	In	the	period	1999-2014,	the	average	
GDP	per	person	in	these	countries	rose	from	60%	to	75%	of	the	EU	average2.	
2	 GDP	 per capita,	 consumption	 per capita	 and	 price	 level	 indices,	 December	 2015;	 http://
ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/GDP_per_capita,	_consumption_per_
capita_and_price_level_indices
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Figure 1.	The	growth	rate	of	GDP	of	selected	groups	of	countries	(%)*
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*	The	euro-zone	average	includes	its	11	founding	member	states	apart	from	Germany.	The	results	are	based	
on	the	arithmetic	mean,	in	order	to	show	the	data	from	the	three	groups	of	countries	in	cross-sectional	
terms.	If	we	were	calculating	the	weighted	average,	the	BRIC	result	would	be	greatly	boosted	by	China,	
and	that	of	the	V4	by	Poland.	This	approach	is	often	used	in	analyses	by	the	German	Chamber	of	Commerce	
and	Industry.
The	chart	data	clearly	shows	that	the	V4	states	have	developed	faster	than	the	
euro-zone	countries	since	2001;	a	growth	spurt	was	especially	visible	in	the	pe-
riod	2001-7.	GDP	rose	more	slowly	in	the	V4	states	in	1999-2014	than	in	the	BRIC	
countries,	but	 it	 cannot	be	ruled	out	 that	 the	pace	of	economic	development	
in	Central	Europe	will	outstrip	the	GDP	growth	rate	of	the	biggest	emerging	
economies	in	the	next	few	years3.	The	comparison	of	V4	with	the	BRIC	coun-
tries	is	particularly	interesting,	as	in	recent	years	companies	from	Germany	
have	focused	on	expansion	in	these	two	groups	of	countries,	so	in	a	way	it	is	
possible	to	treat	them	as	groups	competing	for	German	capital.	
After	 2007,	 economic	 relations	 between	Germany	 and	Central	 Europe	were	
boosted	by	the	process	of	modernisation,	which	was	also	financed	by	the	EU’s	
cohesion	 policy.	 The	 V4	 countries	were	 some	 of	 the	 biggest	 beneficiaries	 of	
these	 funds;	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 they	have	managed	 to	maintain	discipline	 in	
public	finances	 in	recent	years	 (only	Hungary	has	had	a	problem	with	this).	
And	so	in	the	period	of	global	economic	downturn	after	2009,	these	countries	
3	 This	estimate	is	based	on	the	assumption	of	continued	economic	turmoil	in	Brazil	and	Rus-
sia	and	the	structural	problems	accumulating	in	China.
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maintained	high	levels	of	public	investment.	This	was	the	reverse	of	the	situ-
ation	in	many	other	countries,	especially	in	the	south	of	the	euro-zone,	which	
significantly	reduced	their	budgetary	expenditure	under	the	threat	of	 insol-
vency.	Germany	was	by	far	the	greatest	beneficiary	of	the	investment	in	the	
V4	countries	financed	by	 the	EU’s	 cohesion	policy.	Thanks	 to	 this,	Germany	
was	able	at	least	to	rely	on	additional	exports	to	these	countries,	to	the	tune	of	
€30	billion	in	the	period	2004-154.	Thanks	to	the	investments	from	the	cohesion	
fund	in	Central	Europe,	Germany	gained	not	only	directly,	from	the	contracts	
it	 acquired,	 but	 also	 indirectly;	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 these	 funds	was	
spent	on	infrastructure,	which	made	it	easier	to	transport	goods	between	Ger-
many	and	Central	&	Eastern	Europe.	This	was	of	great	importance	for	German	
automotive	companies,	 for	whom	good	 transport	networks	were	a	condition	
for	building	modern	production	facilities	in	the	V4	states.
On	the	question	of	reforming	the	EU,	the	countries	of	Central	Europe	and	Ger-
many	often	found	themselves	on	opposite	sides	politically.	The	dominant	line	
of	disputes	was	the	division	into	old	and	new	EU	countries.	The	V4	states	were	
wary	of	the	extension	of	the	powers	of	EU	institutions	at	the	expense	of	those	
of	their	own	countries,	and	they	long	resisted	the	introduction	of	the	Lisbon	
Treaty.	The	distrust	towards	the	central	European	EU	states	which	joined	in	
2004	was	boosted	by	their	support	for	the	US	intervention	in	Iraq,	for	which	
they	faced	strong	criticism	from	France	and	Germany.	The	lower	level	of	eco-
nomic	development	in	Central	Europe	encouraged	these	countries	to	resist	the	
introduction	of	certain	integration	solutions,	such	as	the	unification	of	CIT	tax	
rates.	The	countries	in	the	region	often	opposed	stricter	climate	policies,	which	
Brussels	saw	as	one	of	the	elements	of	the	EU’s	common	identity.	In	2010,	when	
the	euro-zone	crisis	began,	a	new	dividing	line	appeared	in	the	EU	between	the	
countries	of	North	and	South.	It	appeared,	however,	that	the	southern	coun-
tries	of	 the	euro-zone,	 such	as	Greece,	Spain,	France	and	Portugal,	have	not	
used	their	membership	of	the	euro-zone	to	improve	their	trading	competitive-
ness,	and	after	2010	they	began	to	struggle	with	economic	problems.	Germany,	
which	decided	to	freeze	pay	rises,	make	its	labour	market	more	flexible,	and	
cut	back	on	social	benefits,	found	itself	in	a	much	better	position.	This	was	un-
comfortable	for	Berlin,	because	the	monetary	union	now	included	a	significant	
4	 Report:	assessment	of	the	benefits	obtained	by	the	EU-15	member	states	as	a	result	of	the	im-
plementation	of	the	cohesion	policy	in	the	countries	of	the	Visegrad	Group,	December	2011;	
http://ibs.org.pl/app/uploads/2015/12/Ocena-korzy%C5%9Bci-uzyskiwanych-przez-
pa%C5%84stwa-UE-15-w-wyniku-realizacji-polityki-sp%C3%B3jno%C5%9Bci-w-krajach-
Grupy-Wyszehradzkiej.pdf,	p.	52.
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number	of	member	states	with	problems,	and	thus	there	was	a	risk	that	they	
would	 throw	 the	 burden	 of	 their	 problems	 onto	Germany.	One	 symptom	of	
this	was	the	isolation	of	Germany’s	representatives	on	the	forum	of	the	Euro-
pean	Central	Bank,	whose	decisions	often	went	against	Berlin’s	demands.	In	
this	situation,	the	countries	of	Central	Europe	which	had	joined	the	euro-zone,	
such	as	Estonia,	Lithuania,	Latvia	and	Slovakia,	proved	to	be	valuable	allies	for	
Germany.	Bratislava	was	one	of	the	most	vocal	opponents	to	granting	loans	to	
Athens,	which	at	that	time	was	threatened	by	insolvency.	
The	V4	states	will	be	an	important	voice	in	any	debate	on	further	reforms	to	
the	European	Union	in	the	next	few	years.	When	that	time	comes,	Germany	
will	be	on	the	opposite	side	to	the	southern	euro-zone	countries	because	of	its	
different	economic	conditions.	Currently	a	deepening	gap	can	be	observed	be-
tween	Germany,	which	has	registered	a	favourable	economic	performance	and	
is	reducing	its	debt,	and	the	monetary	union’s	southern	countries,	whose	debts	
are	still	rising.	In	any	future	debate,	Berlin	will	probably	stand	for	a	more	free-
market	EU,	and	it	is	not	clear	whether	it	will	be	able	to	count	on	support	in	this	
matter	from	London,	which	is	considering	leaving	the	Union.	Central	Europe,	
which	is	tied	to	Germany	by	strong	economic	interests,	may	prove	to	be	a	key	
partner	in	the	question	of	reforming	the	EU.	
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II. The developmenT of Trade beTween 
germany and The v4
In	recent	years,	the	V4	group	has	become	one	of	Germany’s	key	trade	partners,	
in	a	 relationship	 that	has	come	closer	 to	 reaching	equality.	Not	only	 is	Ger-
many	the	V4	group’s	most	important	trading	partner,	but	also	vice	versa;	the	V4	
states	as	one	region	are	a	key	partner	for	Germany.	It	is	also	worth	emphasis-
ing	that	although	the	German	economy	is	able	to	generate	a	trade	surplus	with	
most	countries	of	the	world,	it	maintains	a	relative	balance	with	the	V4	states’	
economies.	Their	cooperation	with	Germany	offers	a	wide	range	of	benefits,	
and	has	a	good	opportunity	to	develop,	especially	during	the	global	economic	
downturn.	Despite	 this,	 strong	economic	relations	with	Germany	alone	will	
not	help	the	V4	countries	to	escape	the	so-called	middle	income	trap.	It	is	hard	
to	expect	that	German	companies	will	be	ready	to	move	their	R&D	activity	to	
the	region	on	a	larger	scale,	as	this	is	an	area	which	generates	the	most	profit	
for	the	German	economy.	The	hitherto	profitable	collaboration	with	Germany	
may	discourage	many	companies	from	Central	Europe	from	limiting	their	de-
pendence	on	German	companies	and	working	on	producing	their	own	increas-
ingly	technically	advanced	products.
1. The role of central europe as a key trading partner for germany
In	the	last	decade,	the	role	of	foreign	trade	in	the	German	economy	has	grown	
extremely	rapidly.	Since	2007,	 the	V4	countries	 taken	 together	have	become	
Germany’s	 important	 trading	 partner,	 providing	 the	 most	 components	 for	
German	exporters	(after	the	USA),	and	thus	contributing	to	the	improvement	
in	the	trading	competitiveness	of	Germany’s	economy.
In	the	last	ten	years,	the	development	of	trade	has	become	one	of	Germany’s	
most	 important	 sources	 of	 economic	 growth,	 especially	 since	 internal	 con-
sumption	has	not	proven	to	be	an	important	driver	of	economic	development.	
In	 the	 years	 2004-8,	 Germany’s	 turnover	 rose	 very	 dynamically,	 thanks	 to	
good	times	in	the	euro-zone	and	on	the	emerging	markets.	The	biggest	reces-
sion	 in	post-war	German	history	 in	2009,	when	GDP	fell	by	5%,	did	not	 lead	
to	a	prolonged	weakening	of	growth	in	Germany.	Despite	the	initial	collapse	
of	 German	 trading,	 the	 losses	were	 quickly	 recovered,	 and	 in	 the	 next	 few	
years	sales	of	German	products	abroad	rose	steadily.	Trading	competitiveness	
proved	to	be	one	of	the	main	factors	maintaining	stable	economic	growth	in	
Germany,	and	which	also	strengthened	the	country’s	image	as	a	strong	econo-
my	which	had	managed	to	resist	the	economic	crisis.	The	most	visible	symbol	
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of	this	power	was	the	trade	surplus,	which	had	been	rising	for	a	decade.	Since	
2012,	Germany	has	recorded	the	largest	current-account	surplus	in	the	world5.	
In	2014	 it	amounted	to	US$285	billion,	which	was	almost	double	the	value	of	
that	 of	 second-ranked	China	 (US$150	billion)	 and	almost	 three	 times	higher	
than	third-ranked	Saudi	Arabia	(US$100	billion)6.	The	scale	of	the	success	of	
German	exports	 is	greater	 than	when	compared	with	 the	situation	of	many	
other	countries	in	the	euro-zone,	such	as	Greece,	Spain	or	Portugal,	which	in	
recent	years	have	been	grappling	with	the	consequences	of	significant	current	
account	deficits	which	threaten	to	bankrupt	them.	
Figure 2.	German	exports	to	selected	countries	around	the	world,	and	to	the	
V4	group	(€	billion)
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source:	Federal	Statistical	Office
5	 Goods	trade	is	one	of	the	key	factors	shaping	the	current	account	value,	which	represents	
the	state	of	cash	flows	between	the	country	and	abroad.
6	 Deutschland	hat	weltweit	größten	Exportüberschuss,	Die Welt,	2	February	2015;	http://www.
welt.de/wirtschaft/article137024573/Deutschland-hat-weltweit-groessten-Exportueber-
schuss.html
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There	is	a	direct	relationship	between	the	improvement	of	the	German	econ-
omy	over	recent	years	and	its	closer	commercial	relations	with	Central	Eu-
rope.	The	V4	countries	are	playing	an	ever	greater	role,	from	the	point	of	view	
of	German	economic	interests,	because	they	have	been	receiving	the	largest	
share	of	exports.	Back	in	2008	the	V4	group	taken	together	became	the	most	
important	buyers	of	German	goods;	however,	during	the	economic	crisis	in	
2009,	they	reduced	their	demand	for	German	goods	to	a	greater	extent	than,	
for	 example,	 France.	 In	 subsequent	years	 their	position	gradually	 revived.	
As	a	result,	 in	2014	German	companies	sold	goods	worth	€112	billion	in	the	
V4	countries	–	9.8%	more	than	in	France,	a	country	which	is	richer	and	more	
populous	than	all	the	V4	states	together.	The	V4	countries	also	overtook	Chi-
na	in	this	respect,	by	50%,	and	Russia	by	a	factor	of	four,	even	though	Rus-
sia	is	recognised	in	Germany	as	an	extremely	lucrative	market.	It	should	be	
noted	that	the	strong	position	of	the	V4	countries	would	not	have	been	possi-
ble	without	their	strong	integration	into	the	supply	chain	of	Germany,	whose	
companies	own	many	factories	in	these	countries.	This	also	boosts	German	
exports.	On	one	hand,	German	plants	located	in	V4	countries	acquire	some	of	
their	parts	from	their	mother-factories	in	Germany.	On	the	other,	the	high	
level	of	exports	from	Germany	to	the	V4	countries	also	results	from	the	lat-
ter’s	greater	purchasing	power,	because	they	are	buying	a	growing	propor-
tion	 of	 the	 added	 value	 from	 the	 production	 of	 flagship	German	 products,	
such	as	cars	or	machinery.	
The	trend	in	imports	has	developed	somewhat	differently.	Since	2004,	the	V4	
states	taken	together	have	been	the	most	 important	exporters	onto	the	Ger-
man	market,	and	their	position	did	not	falter	even	during	the	crisis	in	2009,	
the	greatest	recession	in	post-war	German	history.	It	is	worth	noting	that	Ger-
man	imports	from	the	V4	countries	have	continued	at	a	relatively	stable	level,	
compared	with	the	stagnation	of	imports	from	China,	Russia	and	France	over	
the	last	five	years.	This	testifies	to	the	great	importance	of	the	factories	located	
in	V4	countries	in	maintaining	the	price	competitiveness	of	German	industry.	
On	one	hand,	companies	from	Germany	prefer	not	to	increase	their	supplies	
from	other	countries,	while	still	bringing	in	ever	more	goods	from	the	V4	coun-
tries.	On	the	other	hand,	German	companies	have	been	looking	for	new	sup-
pliers	in	Central	Europe,	who	admittedly	would	not	offer	such	low	production	
costs	as	countries	in	Asia,	but	whose	productivity	and	production	quality	could	
match	those	of	countries	in	Western	Europe.	
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Figure 3.	Value	of	Germany’s	foreign	trade	with	individual	countries	per capi-
ta	(€	thousands)	between	2004-2014
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source:	Federal	Statistical	Office
An	interesting	perspective	on	trade	between	Germany	and	V4	is	revealed	by	
a	summary	of	trade	per capita,	which	shows	the	intensity	of	the	trading.	From	
the	chart	we	see	that	the	V4	states	are	characterised	by	higher	trade	with	Ger-
many	per capita	 than	countries	such	as	France	or	 the	United	Kingdom,	with	
a	significant	increase	after	2009.	Among	the	V4	countries	there	are	large	vari-
ations.	 In	2014,	 the	Czech	Republic,	with	nearly	€7000	per	person,	had	only	
slightly	lower	trade	per capita	with	Germany	than	Belgium.	Hungary	and	Slo-
vakia’s	trade	with	Germany	ran	at	around	€4000,	and	Poland	slightly	less,	with	
€2300	per capita	–	nevertheless,	running	ahead	of	Britain	and	approaching	the	
level	of	France.	From	this	it	can	also	be	concluded	that	the	V4	states	still	have	
great	potential	to	expand	their	trade	with	Germany.	The	example	of	countries	
more	strongly	integrated	with	the	German	economy,	such	as	Austria,	Belgium,	
the	Netherlands	or	Switzerland,	shows	that	the	value	of	trade	per capita	could	
reach	€10,000	per	annum.	However,	it	should	be	pointed	out	that	the	high	level	
of	German	trade	with	these	countries	also	stems	from	their	ability	to	sell	their	
own	technologies	 to	German	businesses.	This	 is	 therefore	not	a	relationship	
based	largely	on	manufacturing	products	to	the	order	of	German	companies,	
as	it	is	in	the	case	of	V4.
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Figure 4.	Proportion	of	deliveries	from	selected	countries	in	German	exports7	(%)
0.0
0.5
1.0
1,5
2.0
2.5
1995 2000 2005 2009 2011
[%]
USA V4 France Great
Britain
Italy ChinaRussia
source:	The	OECD-WTO	Trade	in	Value	Added	(TiVA)	database,	May	2013;	http://stats.oecd.org/
The	figures	from	the	OECD	and	the	WTO	databases	allow	us	to	examine	what	
proportion	of	German	exports	was	based	on	components	made	by	individual	
states.	The	role	of	the	V4	countries	as	suppliers	for	German	exporters,	along-
side	China	and	Russia,	has	increased	significantly	in	recent	years.	In	1995,	the	
production	of	V4	comprised	added	value	in	German	overseas	sales	of	0.7%;	over	
the	next	 16	years	 this	 indicator	 tripled	to	2.1%.	 In	this	way,	 the	V4	countries	
took	second	place	(after	the	US)	as	the	most	important	suppliers	for	German	
exporters,	ahead	of	France,	Britain,	Russia,	Italy	and	China.	This	means	that	
the	V4	countries	have	become	one	of	the	most	important	regions	in	Germany’s	
supply	chain,	as	well	as	an	important	source	of	the	competitiveness	of	German	
companies,	especially	for	the	automotive	(3.3%	of	value	added	in	foreign	sales)	
and	construction	 industries	 (2.7%).	Combining	this	data	with	the	figures	 for	
foreign	trade	between	Germany	and	V4,	we	can	come	to	 the	conclusion	that	
21%	of	all	German	imports	from	V4	are	used	in	onward	exports	(in	1995,	this	
figure	amounted	to	13%).	
The	 development	 of	 Germany’s	 commercial	 relations	with	 the	 V4	 countries	
still	has	considerable	potential	for	development,	together	with	the	increasing-
ly	sophisticated	ties	between	these	countries.	It	seems	that	the	prospects	for	
moderate	economic	growth,	or	even	stagnation,	in	Europe	will	boost	German	
companies’	interest	in	reducing	production	costs	by	moving	part	of	their	ac-
tivity	to	Central	Europe,	which	will	be	associated	with	an	increase	in	imports	
7	 This	data	is	available	thanks	to	the	methodology	developed	jointly	by	the	World	Trade	Or-
ganisation	and	the	OECD.	Details	of	the	methodology	available	at:	https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/tradedataday13_e/oecdbrochurejanv13_e.pdf
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from	these	countries.	The	growth	in	prosperity	of	the	V4	countries	will	thus	
result	in	increased	German	exports	to	them.	
The	V4	countries’	success	in	their	relations	with	Germany	is	based	on	stable	
conditions	for	development,	as	well	as	their	geographical	proximity,	which	has	
enabled	the	significant	involvement	of	German	small	and	medium-sized	enter-
prises.	For	this	reason,	German	trade	with	the	V4	countries	has	a	much	higher	
value	than	with	other,	much	larger	states	such	as	Japan,	Russia	or	Turkey.	This	
therefore	demonstrates	the	very	high	degree	of	mutual	complementarity	be-
tween	Germany	and	the	V4	countries.	
2. The position of individual v4 states in their trade with germany
The	development	of	trade	between	Germany	and	the	V4	states	has	led	to	more	
balanced	economic	ties	between	them.	Whereas	in	the	period	2003-14	the	par-
ticipation	of	V4	in	Germany’s	foreign	trade	rose	from	8%	to	20%,	in	the	same	
period,	Germany’s	share	of	trade	with	the	V4	states	taken	together	fell	 from	
30%	to	25%.	
Table 1.	The	position	of	the	V4	countries	among	Germany’s	most	important	
trading	partners
country Trade in 2003(€ billion)
Trade in 2014
(€ billion)
position, 
2003
position, 
2014
rise in 
trading
change in 
position
poland 15.7 87.5 12 8 457% +	4
czech republic 17.5 70.4 11 11 302% 0
hungary 12.2 41.9 15 14 243% +	1
slovakia 7.3 24.1 21 20 230% +	1
germany’s trade 665 1124     69%  
source:	Federal	Statistical	Office
From	the	list	of	Germany’s	most	important	trading	partners,	we	can	see	that	
the	 rise	 in	Germany’s	 foreign	 trade	 turnover	with	V4	 greatly	 exceeded	 the	
overall	average.	This	allowed	these	countries	to	increase	or	at	least	maintain	
their	places	among	Germany’s	most	 important	 trading	partners.	The	Polish	
position	has	risen	the	most,	from	the	12th	to	the	8th	most	important	commercial	
partner	for	Germany;	German	trade	turnover	with	Poland	rose	much	faster	
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than	that	of	 the	other	V4	states.	Slovakia	and	Hungary	moved	up	one	place	
each,	and	the	Czech	Republic	maintained	 its	place	as	Germany’s	 11th	biggest	
trade	partner.	
Figure 5.	Germany’s	most	important	trading	partners	in	2014	(€	billion)
0
50
100
150
200
Fr
an
ce
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Ch
in
a
U
SA
G
re
at
 B
rit
ai
n
Ita
ly
Au
st
ria
Po
la
nd
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
Be
lg
iu
m
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
Ru
ss
ia
Sp
ai
n
H
un
ga
ry
Ja
pa
n
Sw
ed
en
Tu
rk
ey
D
en
m
ar
k
Sl
ov
ak
ia
So
ut
h 
Ko
re
a
UA
E
[€ billion]
167 161 154
118
103
92 87 86 82
70 68
60
42 36 35 33 29 26 24
11
145
source:	Federal	Statistical	Office
The	above	data	shows	that	the	V4	countries	have	overtaken	countries	which	
are	much	larger	or	richer	in	resources	as	Germany’s	trading	partners.	In	this	
classification,	Poland	placed	higher	than	Switzerland	and	Belgium,	the	Czech	
Republic	higher	than	Russia	and	Spain,	Hungary	higher	than	Japan	and	Swe-
den,	and	Slovakia	above	South	Korea.	In	the	case	of	data	relating	to	the	Nether-
lands,	it	should	be	remembered	that	their	figures	are	inflated	by	the	so-called	
Rotterdam	effect;	some	of	the	goods	exported	from	or	imported	to	Germany	via	
Rotterdam	counts	as	foreign	trade	by	the	Netherlands.	This	makes	their	result	
twice	as	high	as	Belgium,	which	is	only	slightly	smaller.
The	rise	of	the	V4	countries’	commercial	importance	for	Germany	is	continu-
ing,	despite	ongoing	intensive	trading	relations	between	Germany	and	the	far	
more	populous	countries	of	Asia	and	South	America8.
8	 Konrad	Popławski,	Chasing	globalisation.	Germany’s	economic	relations	with	the	BRIC	coun-
tries,	 OSW Report,	 25	 November	 2013:	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-re-
port/2013-11-25/chasing-globalisation-germanys-economic-relations-bric-countries
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Figure 6.	Germany’s	share	in	the	V4	countries’	foreign	trade
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source:	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development;	http://unctadstat.unctad.org
In	the	period	2003-14	the	German	share	in	the	V4	states’	foreign	trade	began	
to	fall,	thanks	to	which	Germany’s	dominant	position	was	reduced	from	30%	
to	25%	 for	 the	V4	group	as	a	whole.	During	 the	 same	period,	 the	 total	par-
ticipation	of	the	V4	states	in	Germany’s	foreign	trade	rose	from	7.9%	to	20%.	
Deeper	analysis	allows	us	to	conclude	that	the	individual	V4	countries	have	
maintained	 their	dependences	on	 trade	with	Germany	 to	varying	degrees.	
In	the	period	2003-14,	in	the	case	of	the	Czech	Republic	this	indicator	fell	by	
6	percentage	points	(pp)	to	29%;	for	Hungary,	it	fell	3	pp	to	26%;	for	Poland,	
2.5	pp	to	24%;	and	for	Slovakia,	9	pp	to	19%.	This	change	should	be	considered	
as	desirable,	because	 it	 increases	 the	geographical	diversification	of	 the	V4	
countries’	foreign	trade.
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Figure 7.	Germany’s	exports	to	and	imports	from	individual	Visegrad	Group	
countries	(€	billion)	
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source:	Federal	Statistical	Office
German	exports	to	individual	V4	countries	have	been	proportional	to	the	size	
of	their	economies,	which	results	from	the	similarity	of	their	demand	for	Ger-
man	goods.	After	accession	to	the	EU,	sales	of	goods	from	Germany	to	Poland	
developed	most	rapidly	(15%	annually	on	average)	a	little	more	slowly	to	Slo-
vakia	(10%)	and	the	Czech	Republic	(9%),	and	most	slowly	in	Hungary	(5.5%).	
The	economic	crisis	in	2009	affected	exports	from	Germany	to	the	V4,	which	
dropped	by	20-30%.	German	companies	took	the	longest	time	to	recover	from	
the	losses	of	2009	in	exports	to	Hungary,	achieving	this	only	after	five	years,	
whereas	in	the	case	of	the	other	V4	states	three	years	was	enough.	
In	analysing	German	imports	from	the	V4	countries,	the	very	strong	position	
of	the	Czech	Republic	is	noteworthy.	The	German	market	receives	only	slightly	
fewer	goods	 from	the	Czech	Republic	 than	 it	does	 from	the	much	 larger	Po-
land.	Czech	manufacturers	provide	Germany	with	far	more	goods	per capita	
than	Slovakia	or	Hungary.	However,	if	we	look	at	the	dynamics	of	the	growth	
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of	imports	to	Germany	from	the	V4	countries	after	their	accession	to	the	EU,	
Poland	is	the	leader	(with	an	average	growth	rate	of	15%),	followed	by	the	Czech	
Republic	(12%),	Slovakia	(7.5%)	and	Hungary	(6.5%).	
Figure 8.	Germany’s	trade	balance	with	selected	countries	(€	billion)
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source:	Federal	Statistical	Office
In	recent	years,	Germany	experienced	a	negative	balance	of	trade	with	raw-
material	suppliers	such	as	Norway	and	Russia,	as	well	as	its	major	subcontrac-
tors,	such	as	China.	Germany	remained	a	positive	trade	balance	with	highly	
developed	states,	such	as	the	USA,	Great	Britain,	France	and	Austria.	Against	
this	background,	its	trade	balance	with	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hun-
gary	was	close	to	even.	Initially	Poland	saw	a	growing	trade	deficit	with	Ger-
many,	although	this	has	fallen	 in	recent	years,	 to	 the	 level	of	€8	billion.	The	
other	V4	countries,	after	several	years	of	relative	stability,	have	begun	experi-
encing	a	surplus	in	trade	with	Germany.	However,	these	results	require	some	
clarification.	Data	 from	 the	Polish	Main	Statistical	Office	 shows	 that	Poland	
actually	recorded	a	trade	surplus	with	Germany	for	several	years9.	The	ability	
9	 Polish	data	shows	that	Poland	had	a	trade	surplus	with	Germany	in	2014	of	€6.5	billion,	as	it	
had	recorded	about	€4	billion	more	in	exports	to	Germany	(€43.6	billion)	and	€10	billion	less	
in	imports	from	Germany	(€37	billion	euros).	According	to	the	information	from	the	Main	
Statistical	Office,	these	differences	stem	from	the	fact	that	in	German	statistics,	goods	sent	
from	China	to	Poland	via	the	German	ports	are	counted	as	exports	from	Germany	to	Poland.	
If	Polish	calculations	had	been	considered	in	the	figure,	Poland’s	trade	position	with	regard	
to	Germany	would	be	closer	to	that	of	the	other	V4	states.	(Response	by	the	vice-president	of	
the	Main	Statistical	Office,	under	the	authority	of	the	President	of	the	Council	of	Ministers,	
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to	generate	a	balanced	trade	relationship,	however,	does	not	derive	from	the	
current	attractiveness	of	V4	products	for	German	consumers,	but	rather	from	
exports	from	the	German	factories	located	in	these	countries.	
3. risks associated with the v4’s dependence on trade with germany
The	trade	structures	of	both	Germany	and	the	V4	states	are	similar.	Certain	
sectors	 predominate,	 such	 as:	 machinery,	 vehicles,	 and	 chemical	 products.	
Companies	from	these	industries	are	the	leading	businesses	in	Germany,	and	
at	the	same	time	major	investors	in	the	V4	states.	Such	trade	will	bring	benefits	
to	the	V4	countries	in	the	medium	term,	but	in	the	long	term	it	is	associated	
with	 the	 risk	 of	 dependence	 on	 overly	 homogeneous	 production	 structures,	
and	on	failure	to	develop	in	the	IT	&	telecommunications	sector.	
Figure 9.	Structure	of	Germany’s	export	to	V4	countries	in	2014	(%)*
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*	Categories	based	on	the	SITC	classification.	The	‘food	&	tobacco’	category	als 	covers	live	animals,	
animal	and	vegetable	fats	and	oils.	The	‘raw	materials’	category	includes	minerals,	as	well	as	non-mine-
ral	items	such	as	rubber,	cotton	and	iron	ore.	The	‘semi-finished	goods’	category	includes	items	such	as	
paper,	textiles,	cement	and	steel.	The	‘other’	category	covers	furniture,	clothing,	shoes,	cameras,	books	
and	toys	among	others	(see	http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=14).
source:	Federal	Statistical	Office
to	question	no.	22326	on	the	discrepancies	of	statistics	on	trade	between	the	Republic	of	Po-
land	and	the	German	Federal	Republic,	presented	by	the	CSO	and	the	Federal	Statistical	Of-
fice;	http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/IZ6.nsf/main/275B09FA)
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The	structure	of	German	exports	to	the	individual	V4	countries	is	similar.	The	
majority	of	sales	by	German	companies	are	the	flagship	products	of	the	coun-
try’s	economy,	namely	machines	and	cars:	most	to	Hungary,	slightly	less	to	the	
Czech	Republic	and	Slovakia,	and	the	least	to	Poland.	It	is	worth	pointing	out	
that	some	of	these	exports	were	components	for	the	factories	of	the	German	
corporations	located	in	these	countries.	A	significant	share	of	the	exports	from	
Germany	to	V4	is	made	up	of	semi-finished	goods,	other	finished	products	and	
chemical	products.	Poland,	which	imports	a	much	smaller	percentage	of	cars	
from	Germany	than	other	V4	countries,	receives	proportionately	more	goods	
from	other	categories.	This	probably	accounts	for	the	smaller	participation	of	
German	automotive	factories	in	trade	between	Poland	and	Germany.	On	one	
hand,	it	shows	the	lower	involvement	of	German	car	companies	in	Poland	in	
relation	to	the	size	of	the	economy	than	in	the	rest	of	V4.	On	the	other,	the	ad-
vantage	of	such	a	relationship	is	that	the	Polish	economy	is	less	susceptible	to	
crises	on	the	automotive	market.	For	example,	in	2009,	when	global	car	market	
sales	collapsed,	 the	economies	of	 the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hungary	
fell	into	recession,	while	Poland	was	able	to	maintain	economic	growth.	
Figure 10.	The	structure	of	German	imports	from	V4	countries	in	2014	(%)
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The	structure	of	German	imports	from	the	V4	countries	 is	similar	to	that	of	
exports.	It	is	worth	noting	that	in	Germany’s	trade	with	the	Czech	Republic,	
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Slovakia	and	Hungary,	the	automotive	sector’s	share	is	higher	in	imports	than	
exports.	This	means	that	these	three	V4	states	have	been	able	to	achieve	a	sur-
plus	with	Germany	 in	 the	 trade	 of	 cars	 and	 car	 parts.	Despite	 the	 fact	 that	
a	significant	portion	of	the	revenue	goes	to	the	German	automotive	companies	
which	own	the	factories,	it	also	benefits	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hun-
gary,	thanks	to	greater	employment	in	these	countries,	as	well	as	increased	tax	
receipts.	Compared	to	these	countries,	trade	between	Germany	and	Poland	in	
automotive	products	is	much	more	balanced.	When	analysing	the	remaining	
categories	of	German	imports	from	the	V4	countries,	we	notice	the	relatively	
small	proportion	of	chemical	products,	due	to	the	continued	strong	preference	
of	German	chemical	companies	to	maintain	production	in	Germany.	One	fea-
ture	of	German	imports	from	Poland	is	(as	in	the	case	of	exports)	greater	di-
versity	than	in	the	case	of	the	other	V4	states.	A	large	percentage	of	Poland’s	
exports	to	Germany	is	represented	by	foodstuffs	and	finished	products.	
When	analysing	the	OECD	data,	we	may	add	that	49%	of	the	car	parts	exported	
from	Poland	to	Germany	are	imported	by	automotive	companies	from	Germa-
ny	for	their	own	exports.	For	the	Czech	Republic,	this	ratio	is	32%,	for	Slova-
kia	29%	and	for	Hungary	21%.	The	situation	regarding	the	export	of	parts	for	
machines	is	similar;	 in	the	case	of	Poland,	53%	of	parts	sent	to	Germany	are	
re-exported	onwards,	in	the	case	of	Slovakia	42%,	in	the	Czech	Republic	32%,	
and	Hungary	27%.	Poland	provides	more	components	for	products	exported	by	
German	companies	than	the	other	V4	countries.
This	close	dependence	on	Germany	poses	a	risk	of	instability	for	the	econom-
ic	development	of	Central	Europe.	The	economic	development	of	Germany	is	
based	on	the	large	participation	of	foreign	trade,	due	to	which	the	country	is	
dependent	on	the	business	cycle	on	the	global	marketplace	to	a	greater	extent	
than	other	large	economies.	If	global	trade	slows	down	over	the	next	few	years,	
Germany	may	suffer	from	this	more	than	those	member	states	which	are	de-
veloping	 thanks	 to	domestic	 factors.	 It	 is	not	known	whether	Germany	will	
be	able	to	maintain	its	considerable	trade	surplus.	Many	countries,	as	well	as	
the	International	Monetary	Fund,	have	criticised	Germany	in	recent	years	for	
running	a	model	of	economic	development	which	is	unbalanced	and	contrib-
utes	to	the	emergence	of	global	imbalances.	Germany’s	high	trade	surplus	has	
been	a	considerable	source	of	income	for	German	companies.	However,	it	also	
contributes	to	significant	imbalances	in	the	euro-zone,	since	the	income	is	not	
spent	within	Germany	itself,	but	instead	is	transferred	abroad,	in	the	form	of	
either	investments	or	loans,	for	example,	to	the	most	indebted	countries	in	the	
euro-zone.	At	the	same	time,	infrastructure	in	Germany	has	been	neglected,	
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and	 its	 condition	 has	 deteriorated	 over	 recent	 years.	However,	 it	 cannot	 be	
ruled	out	that	this	situation	will	change	over	the	next	few	years.	Germany	has	
recently	witnessed	a	revival	in	domestic	demand;	the	German	government	is	
also	aware	of	the	problems	of	the	low	level	of	investment	in	the	country.	Sig-
mar	 Gabriel,	 Vice-Chancellor	 and	 economy	 minister,	 suggested	 in	 January	
2016	that	€600	billion	euros	should	be	invested	in	infrastructure	development,	
education,	and	supporting	the	car	industry	by	2025	(by	means	of	a	surcharge	
on	the	purchase	of	electric	cars)10.	
Germany	has	for	years	been	criticised	by	the	United	States,	some	euro-area	
states,	as	well	as	 international	economic	institutions	such	as	the	IMF11	and	
the	OECD12,	for	basing	its	economic	development	on	exports,	generating	high	
trade	surpluses	and	insufficient	growth	in	domestic	demand.	Germany’s	in-
ternational	competitiveness	is	based	in	particular	on	the	success	of	the	auto-
motive	and	electro-mechanical	 sectors.	The	dynamic	development	of	 these	
industries	 in	 recent	 years	 stemmed	 in	 large	part	 from	 the	development	 of	
emerging	economies	that	need	machines	and	vehicles	to	carry	out	the	pro-
cess	of	modernisation.	The	developed	economies,	and	in	particular	the	euro-
zone,	were	not	such	an	attractive	outlet	market	because	of	the	need	to	imple-
ment	budgetary	savings.	In	the	face	of	rising	geopolitical	threats,	structural	
problems,	 the	 fall	 in	 income	 from	 the	 sale	of	 raw	materials,	 as	well	 as	 the	
risk	of	capital	outflow,	it	seems	that	the	emerging	economies	will	not	be	able	
in	subsequent	years	to	replace	the	developed	countries	in	generating	global	
economic	growth.	Among	the	countries	that	have	generated	large	commer-
cial	benefits	for	Germany	in	recent	years,	two	are	in	serious	crisis	(Brazil	and	
Russia),	and	the	situation	of	China	–	the	third	and	most	important	of	the	BRIC	
states	for	the	German	market	–	is	fraught	with	increasing	uncertainty.	If	the	
clear	decline	in	the	growth	rate	of	emerging	economies	proves	to	be	a	durable	
phenomenon,	demand	for	German	capital	goods	will	fall,	which	in	turn	will	
reduce	the	level	of	orders	from	the	factories	of	German	companies	located	in	
the	V4	states.	
10	 SPD:	600	Milliarden	Euro	für	Modernisierung,	Handelsblatt,	29	January	2016,	p.	7.
11	 Konrad	Popławski,	Germany	is	defending	its	exports-based	model	of	economic	development,	
OSW Analyses,	17	November	2010;	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2010-11-17/
germany-defending-its-exports-based-model-economic-development
12	 Germany:	Keeping	the	Edge:	Competitiveness	for	Inclusive	Growth,	Better	Policies	Series,	
OECD,	February	2014,	p.	6-8;	http://www.oecd.org/germany/Better-policies-germany.pdf
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Figure 11.	GDP	growth	in	selected	EU	countries	in	2009	(%)
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The	 risks	 associated	with	 becoming	 dependent	 on	 a	 favourable	 situation	 in	
world	trade	are	well	illustrated	by	the	economic	situation	in	Europe	in	2009.	
The	world	entered	recession,	and	global	trade	flows	in	goods	fell	by	12%.	The	
global	crisis	affected	Germany	and	the	V4	countries	(except	Poland)	to	an	ex-
ceptional	degree;	they	saw	worse	results	than	the	average	for	the	EU	as	a	whole.	
The	Czech	Republic,	Germany,	Slovakia	and	Hungary	recorded	some	of	the	big-
gest	falls	in	GDP	in	the	world	at	that	time,	in	contrast	to	those	countries	which	
had	less	homogeneous	structures	of	production.	
The	cooperation	between	 the	V4	countries	and	Germany	poses	 the	 risk	 that	
the	V4	states	will	become	stuck	in	the	group	of	countries	with	a	medium	level	
of	development.	 In	recent	years,	 the	concept	of	 the	 ‘middle	 income	trap’	has	
begun	to	enjoy	a	certain	popularity.	On	the	basis	of	historical	studies,	econo-
mists	have	concluded	that	it	does	not	require	unique	skills	for	a	given	state	to	
enter	the	group	of	countries	with	an	average	GDP,	as	just	keeping	labour	costs	
low	is	enough.	It	 is	much	more	of	a	challenge	to	 join	the	elite	of	the	highest-
developed	countries,	because	to	do	so	it	is	necessary	to	build	a	national	system	
of	 innovation,	 that	 is,	 to	create	 the	 institutional	and	economic	conditions	 to	
make	modern,	competitive	and	profitable	products	and	services.	Many	states	
have	proved	unable	to	overcome	this	obstacle	in	the	past13.	
The	economic	cooperation	between	the	V4	countries	and	Germany,	which	has	
been	unbalanced	by	sales	of	goods	under	their	own	brand	names,	may	be	fac-
ing	two	threats.	The	lucrative	nature	of	the	cooperation	between	V4	businesses	
and	their	German	partners	could	deprive	the	former	of	the	motivation	to	take	
risks	 in	 developing	 their	 own	 technologies	 and	 brands.	 The	wage	 increases	
13	 Fernando	Gabriel	Im,	David	Rosenblatt,	Middle-Income	Traps-A	Conceptual	and	Empirical	
Survey,	World	Bank	2013;	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent-
Server/WDSP/IB/2013/09/09/000158349_20130909085739/Rendered/PDF/WPS6594.pdf
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linked	to	this	could	lead	to	the	loss	of	other	countries,	who	would	offer	lower	
wages.	In	addition,	the	strategy	of	assembling	products	for	German	companies	
is	in	the	long	run	linked	to	the	risk	of	job	losses	in	the	industry,	as	happened	in	
the	case	of	Spain,	Italy	and	the	United	Kingdom,	to	the	benefit	of	other,	cheap-
er	countries	such	as	Turkey	or	Ukraine.	Selling	products	from	Central	Europe	
under	the	brand	names	of	companies	from	Germany	does	not	help	in	creating	
their	own,	powerful,	recognisable	brands	on	a	global	scale,	and	this	is	an	es-
sential	condition	for	obtaining	significant	profit	margins.
Secondly,	 the	development	of	 the	V4	 states’	 economic	 cooperation	with	Ger-
many	 has	 not	 been	 associated	with	 an	 influx	 of	 knowledge	 connected	with	
information	and	communication	technologies,	which	would	seem	to	be	a	key	
factor	in	future	economic	success.	German	companies	do	not	specialise	in	this	
field.	For	this	reason,	heads	of	German	companies	have	been	watching	the	ex-
pansion	of	American	and	Chinese	ICT	sector	enterprises	into	traditional	mar-
kets	and	their	attempts	to	create	driverless	cars	with	growing	unease,	as	this	
could	threaten	the	strong	position	of	the	German	automotive	industry.	In	2015	
Volkswagen’s	chairman	Martin	Winterkorn	mentioned	for	the	first	time	that	
IT	companies	such	as	Apple	and	Google,	which	are	pursuing	advanced	study	
on	driverless	cars,	could	be	his	firm’s	main	competitors	in	the	future14.	Leaders	
of	the	German	economy	have	grasped	that	if	they	simply	remain	manufactur-
ers	of	devices	and	machines,	 they	will	be	reducing	 their	profits	and	 leaving	
substantial	parts	of	them	in	the	hands	of	the	manufacturers	of	the	software	
they	use15.	In	the	past	few	years,	for	example,	Samsung	has	found	itself	in	such	
a	situation;	it	makes	only	small	margins	on	its	mobile	phones,	while	most	of	the	
profits	go	to	Google,	with	its	Android	operating	system.	
14	 Winterkorn:	Begrüße	das	Engagement	von	Apple,	Google	und	co.;	http://www.manager-
magazin.de/unternehmen/autoindustrie/winterkorn-begruesse-engagement-von-apple-
google-und-co-a-1021447.html
15	 Germany’s	industry:	Does	Deutschland	do	digital?,	Economist,	21	November	2015;	http://www.
economist.com/news/business/21678774-europes-biggest-economy-rightly-worried-
digitisation-threat-its-industrial
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III.  The flow of InvesTmenTs beTween 
germany and v4
In	recent	years,	investment	relations	between	Germany	and	the	countries	of	
the	V4	have	developed	intensively,	but	unilaterally.	Germany	is	the	key	sup-
plier	of	foreign	capital	for	most	of	these	countries,	and	it	is	German	investors	
who	have	 thus	determined	 the	directions	 in	which	 foreign	 trade	has	devel-
oped.	However,	this	is	not	a	unique	situation.	Many	countries	have	been	net	re-
cipients	of	capital	from	Germany,	as	thanks	to	a	significant	increase	in	exports	
in	recent	years,	companies	from	Germany	have	had	considerable	resources	of	
cash	free	to	make	such	investments.	The	influx	of	investment	from	Germany	
to	V4,	however,	would	not	have	been	possible	without	a	significant	improve-
ment	in	the	attractiveness	of	investing	in	Central	Europe,	in	which	the	assess-
ment	of	Poland	has	improved	the	most.	
1. The flow of investments between germany and v4
Foreign	trade	turnover	between	countries	can	be	subject	to	large	fluctuations.	For	
this	reason,	the	level	of	investment	is	a	reliable	indicator	showing	the	degree	of	
maturity	of	economic	cooperation,	since	the	placement	of	investments	in	a	given	
country	is	a	more	accurate	analysis	of	that	country’s	prospects	for	development.	
On	the	basis	of	investment	data,	it	can	clearly	be	seen	that	the	economic	ties	be-
tween	Germany	and	the	V4	states	are	strengthening.	However,	an	analysis	of	the	
investment	streams	allows	us	to	discern	the	still	significant	levels	of	asymmetry	
in	those	relationships.	Germany	is	the	largest	provider	of	net	capital	to	the	mem-
ber	states,	thus	affecting	the	direction	of	the	V4	states’	economic	development.	
Figure 12.	The	share	of	German	capital	in	investment	flows	to	the	V4	coun-
tries	in	2008	and	2012	(%)	
[%]
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source:	Databases	of	the	central	banks	of	the	V4	countries
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In	recent	years,	Germany	has	retained	 its	position	as	 the	 largest	 investor	 in	
all	the	V4	states,	with	the	exception	of	the	Czech	Republic,	where	the	Nether-
lands	came	well	ahead.	The	share	of	German	capital	in	investments	in	the	V4	
countries	increased	slightly	in	the	cases	of	Poland	and	Hungary,	and	decreased	
slightly	in	the	Czech	Republic	and	Slovakia.	In	general,	it	can	therefore	be	con-
cluded	that	Germany’s	position	as	an	investor	 in	the	V4	countries	has	devel-
oped	steadily	over	the	past	few	years.
Figure 13.	Total	foreign	direct	investment	by	Germany	in	selected	countries	
and	in	the	V4	states	(€	billion)
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In	the	period	2004-12,	the	value	of	foreign	investments	from	Germany	in	the	
V4	countries	has	doubled,	from	€36	billion	to	€77	billion.	The	V4	states	taken	to-
gether	are	one	of	the	main	targets	of	German	investment,	and	in	2012	they	over-
took	the	Netherlands	(€74	billion),	which	is	traditionally	linked	to	Germany	by	
very	strong	economic	relationships,	and	which	is	Germany’s	most	important	
logistics	hub.	The	most	important	places	where	German	capital	is	invested	are	
the	United	States	(€269	billion)	and	the	United	Kingdom	(€120	billion),	which	
as	strong	financial	centres	provide	a	number	of	services	for	companies	from	
Germany.	Investments	by	German	companies	in	China	(€42	billion)	were	sig-
nificantly	lower	than	in	the	V4	countries,	although	they	have	expanded	very	
rapidly.	German	 capital	 located	 in	Russia	 (€21	 billion)	was	 also	 significantly	
lower	in	value	than	the	funds	invested	in	V4	countries,	although	these	figures	
do	not	take	into	account	the	still	significant	outflow	of	investments	from	Rus-
sia	due	to	the	war	in	Ukraine.	From	this	data,	it	can	be	concluded	that	in	a	rela-
tively	short	period	of	time,	the	V4	countries	managed	to	attract	not	only	the	
big	German	companies,	but	also	small-	and	medium-sized	enterprises,	thanks	
to	which	the	scale	of	German	investment	in	the	V4	has	come	to	exceed	that	in	
China	or	Russia.	
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Figure 14.	Foreign	direct	Investment	in	the	V4	countries	
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Analysis	of	German	investment	in	individual	V4	countries	clearly	shows	that	
the	 Czech	 Republic	 has	 attracted	most	 investment.	 In	 recent	 years,	 Poland	
has	begun	to	catch	up	with	them;	Hungary	comes	in	third	place	and	Slovakia	
fourth.	However,	comparing	these	values	with	the	population	of	each	country,	
we	see	that	Poland	receives	by	far	the	least	investment,	only	about	a	third	of	
the	investment	per capita	of	what	Hungary	and	Slovakia	receives,	and	a	quarter	
of	the	Czech	Republic.	This	means	that	the	intensity	of	German	investments	in	
Poland	is	much	lower	than	in	other	V4	countries.	Despite	this,	we	can	see	that	
this	difference	is	slowly	being	levelled	out.	Investment	growth	from	Germany	
in	 the	period	2004-12	was	 fastest	 in	Poland	 (a	 cumulative	 increase	of	 160%);	
next	were	Slovakia	(129%)	and	the	Czech	Republic	(111%),	and	Hungary	in	a	very	
distant	fourth	place	(32%).
Recent	years	have	brought	a	steep	rise	in	capital	commitment	in	Central	Europe	
from	German	industries	such	as	the	automotive	and	logistical	sectors,	which	
have	recognised	the	advantages	of	investing	in	the	region	in	order	to	improve	
their	competitiveness	and	consolidate	their	position	on	the	world	market.	For	
its	part,	the	retail	industry	has	launched	a	dynamic	expansion	in	the	region,	
taking	advantage	of	the	growing	consumption	which	has	reinforced	its	posi-
tion	in	Europe.	For	other	sectors,	such	as	energy	or	banking,	the	last	few	years	
have	been	a	period	of	stagnation,	or	a	time	in	which	to	verify	their	investment	
opportunities.	 Generally	 it	 can	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 German	 businesses	
have	increased	the	scope	of	their	investments	in	Central	Europe,	to	the	extent	
that	their	financial	situations	have	allowed	(see	Appendix).
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Figure 15.	The	influence	of	individual	countries	on	the	balance	of	secondary	
income	of	Germany	(€	billion)
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source:	The	author’s	own	calculations,	based	on	the	Bundesbank’s	database:	Makroökonomische	Zeitre-
ihen,	http://www.bundesbank.de/Navigation/DE/Statistiken/Zeitreihen_Datenbanken/Makrooekono-
mische_Zeitreihen/makrooekonomische_zeitreihen_node.html	
By	analysing	balance	of	 secondary	 income,	which	show	what	 the	balance	of	
profit	flows	and	assets	held	 abroad	 looks	 like,	we	 can	partially	 evaluate	 the	
size	of	the	benefit	in	the	form	of	dividends	from	German	investments	in	the	
V4	countries.	The	data	shows	that	in	the	period	2004-12,	investment	in	Hun-
gary	produced	€22	billion	of	revenues,	 in	the	Czech	Republic	€14	billion,	and	
in	Poland	€1.6	billion	(figures	for	Slovakia	are	not	available);	in	all	countries,	
then,	a	trend	towards	growth	is	visible.	It	seems	that	Germany’s	deficit	in	re-
lations	with	Poland	in	the	period	2000-6	should	be	read	as	resulting	from	the	
fact	that	German	companies	have	mainly	invested	without	receiving	signifi-
cant	returns	on	their	investments.	In	recent	years,	the	outflow	of	capital	from	
Poland	may	have	been	inhibited	by	the	growing	number	of	Polish	workers	in	
Germany,	who	transfer	some	of	their	earnings	back	to	their	own	country.	
Figure 16.	The	value	of	foreign	direct	investments	from	V4	countries		
in	Germany	in	2008	and	2012	(€	billion)	
[€ billion]
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A	 comparison	 of	 investment	 flows	 from	 Germany	 to	 the	 V4	 countries	 with	
capital	flowing	in	the	opposite	direction	allows	us	to	perceive	the	considerable	
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imbalance	in	investment	potentials	on	both	sides.	The	value	of	V4	capital	in-
volved	in	Germany	made	up	only	3.5%	of	the	German	funds	invested	in	V4.	It	is	
clear	that	the	only	country	that	significantly	increased	its	investment	in	Ger-
many	was	Poland.	The	value	of	Polish	capital	invested	in	Germany	in	the	pe-
riod	2008-12	rose	by	233%	to	€2	billion,	while	the	scale	of	the	investment	com-
mitments	of	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hungary	remained	unchanged	
or	even	decreased.	The	increased	involvement	of	Polish	companies’	capital	in	
Germany	could	be	the	result	of	the	improving	competitiveness	of	Polish	compa-
nies,	such	as	the	furniture	or	computer	sectors,	which	has	begun	to	challenge	
some	of	their	German	competitors.	In	the	period	2008-13,	23%	of	Polish	invest-
ments	in	Germany	were	in	the	computer	industry,	16%	in	financial	services	for	
companies,	and	14%	in	machine	production.	Many	Polish	companies	have	also	
decided	to	enter	the	German	market	in	order	to	receive	the	label	‘Made	in	Ger-
many’,	which	could	be	a	valuable	asset	in	their	further	expansion	onto	foreign	
markets.	The	analysis	shows	that	41%	of	Polish	investment	projects	in	Germa-
ny	involved	opening	sales	and	marketing	divisions,	18%	covered	the	opening	of	
company	headquarters	in	Germany,	and	11%	involved	offering	services	there16.
2. motives for investment
The	main	motive	for	German	companies	to	invest	in	Central	Europe	is	sales	and	
customer	service	on	the	local	market,	as	well	as	reducing	costs.	German	capital	
therefore	often	goes	to	the	V4	countries	in	order	to	generate	savings	on	produc-
ing	goods	which	are	often	sold	in	the	countries	of	western	Europe.	With	dif-
ferences	in	pay	still	remaining,	such	trends	are	quite	natural.	The	problem	is,	
however,	that	German	companies	still	do	not	see	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	
as	places	in	which	to	invest	in	research	and	development,	even	over	the	next	
ten	 years,	 deeming	 the	 developed	 countries	 to	 be	more	 attractive	 locations.	
China	and	India	are	also	more	attractive	in	this	respect;	because	they	are	such	
large	and	geographically	remote	markets,	more	and	more	German	companies	
see	 the	advantage	 in	 locating	 their	R&D	centres	 close	 to	 the	 factories	 there.	
On	the	one	hand,	this	could	mean	that	the	V4	countries	are	geographically	too	
close	and	have	too	similar	structures	of	production	to	Germany	to	be	able	to	at-
tract	German	R&D	investments.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	the	geographical	
and	cultural	proximity	of	Central	Europe	could	be	an	opportunity	to	provide	
business	process	outsourcing	in	this	region	for	German	companies.
16	 Polnische	Unternehmen	erobern	neue	Märkte,	10	November	2014;	http://www.gtai.de/GTAI/
Navigation/DE/Trade/Maerkte/suche,t=polnische-unternehmen-erobern-neue-maerkte,	
did=1112698.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
36
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
06
/2
01
6
Figure 17.	The	popularity	of	different	regions	as	investment	locations		
for	German	industry,	and	the	main	motives	for	investment	in	2014
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Frühjahr	2015,	the	German	Chamber	of	Industry	and	Commerce,	Berlin	2015,	p.	15
An	analysis	of	the	investment	relationship	between	Germany	and	V4	should	start	
by	examining	those	countries’	popularity	as	investment	locations	(given	as	a	num-
ber	above	the	bars),	and	the	motives	for	investing	in	those	countries	(given	inside	
the	figures).	The	data	shows	that	the	new	EU	countries17,	which	include	the	V4,	are	
the	fifth	most	popular	destination	for	investment	from	German	industries.	How-
ever,	considering	that	the	new	EU	member	states	are	the	region	with	the	smallest	
potential	in	terms	of	economy	and	population,	then	their	position	is	more	signifi-
cant.	They	are	more	frequently	chosen	for	German	industrial	investments	than	
South	America,	Turkey,	or	countries	in	Eastern	and	Southern	Europe.	
Analysing	the	motives	behind	the	investment	of	German	capital	in	Central	Eu-
rope,	we	can	see	how	different	this	region	is	from	other	parts	of	the	world.	The	
data	shows	that	the	most	important	purpose	of	investing	in	the	new	EU	coun-
tries	is	to	sell	to	customers	on	the	domestic	markets,	and	to	offer	them	services	
(42%).	Compared	with	other	regions,	moves	to	reduce	costs	make	up	a	significant	
proportion	of	the	investments	in	the	new	EU	countries	(39%).	No	other	region	is	
used	by	German	industry	in	this	way	to	reduce	production	costs.	However,	this	
result	 is	not	surprising,	because	given	that	the	EU	is	a	single	market,	moving	
production	to	the	cheapest	region	is	a	natural	process.	In	other	countries	there	
are	special	requirements	for	a	specific	proportion	of	production	to	be	of	local	ori-
gin,	as	well	as	bureaucratic	barriers	limiting	production	for	other	markets.	That	
17	 In	this	figure,	the	‘new’	EU	countries	means	those	member	states	which	joined	the	EU	after	2003.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
37
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
6/
20
16
is	why	only	18%	of	German	investment	in	China	is	aimed	at	reducing	production	
costs.	A	less	important	motive	for	investing	in	new	EU	countries	compared	to	
other	regions	is	production	for	the	local	markets	(19%),	as	this	is	a	much	more	
important	reason	to	invest	capital	in	North	&	South	America	and	China.	
Studies	suggest	that	China	and	Central	Europe	serve	completely	different	func-
tions	for	the	German	economy.	Central	Europe	is	much	more	attractive	due	to	its	
geographical	and	cultural	proximity18;	it	offers	moderate	production	costs,	high-
ly-qualified	human	capital	and	increasing	productivity,	and	is	the	location	for	
the	production	of	more	specialised	and	complex	goods,	primarily	for	the	Euro-
pean	market.China	in	turn,	due	to	low	wages,	large	numbers	of	engineers,	a	very	
large	availability	of	suppliers,	the	proximity	of	resources,	and	its	huge	internal	
market,	is	a	location	for	mass-produced	goods	aimed	at	the	local	market,	and	also	
in	part	at	 foreign	markets.	A	key	difference	between	these	two	regions	 is	 the	
flexibility	of	production	and	the	security	of	technology.	Production	in	China	in-
volves	the	risks	of	technology	leaks	and	unpredictable	government	actions,	and	
there	is	also	less	flexibility	in	adapting	production	to	significant	recent	fluctua-
tions	in	global	demand,	as	it	requires	quite	some	time	to	adapt.	It	also	requires	
much	greater	outlay	on	logistics.	Central	Europe	offers	a	more	stable	institution-
al	framework,	as	well	as	high	flexibility	in	adapting	production	to	global	fluctua-
tions	in	demand,	so	that	producers	can	keep	tighter	control	of	the	production.
Figure 18.	The	most	attractive	regions	for	research	and	development		
(on	a	scale	from	1	–	unimportant	to	4	–	very	important)	
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18	 H.-G.	Scheibe,	China	oder	Osteuropa?	Richtige	Antwort	auf	eine	falsche	Frage;	http://www.
roi.de/fileadmin/ROI_DIALOG/ab_DIALOG_38/ROI__DIALOG_41_web.pdf
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Studies	suggest	that	the	V4	countries	will	not	be	a	priority	target	for	innovation	
transfer	over	the	next	ten	years.	According	to	a	survey	carried	out	among	the	
decision-makers	of	60	German	medium-	and	large-sized	companies,	the	coun-
tries	of	central	&	eastern	Europe	are	the	fourth	most	 important	 location	for	
R&D	investment	(jointly with	India)	after	Western	Europe,	North	America	and	
China.	Their	position	will	be	 strengthened	by	2025,	but	 their	distance	 from	
Western	countries	and	China	will	still	be	significant.	The	study	also	found	that	
the	position	of	Central	&	Eastern	Europe	will	be	particularly	important	in	the	
R&D	field	of	the	automotive	industry,	but	less	so	in	the	production	sector.	
There	are	slightly	more	optimistic	conclusions	from	other	studies,	which	show	
that	German	companies	are	becoming	more	interested	in	moving	various	inter-
nal	activities,	such	as	financial	and	human	resources	management,	to	foreign	
affiliates.	 In	2011,	65%	of	companies	preferred	 to	keep	 their	principal	activi-
ties	in	Germany,	19%	favoured	transferring	some	of	these	processes	to	Central	
&	Eastern	Europe,	and	only	3%	to	other	emerging	economies	such	as	Brazil,	
China	or	India19.	It	is	primarily	transport	and	logistics	companies	that	are	mov-
ing	their	activities	to	Central	&	Eastern	Europe	(25%	of	them	have	branches	in	
the	region),	as	well	as	banking	(24%),	and	IT	(24%).	Companies	from	the	bank-
ing,	energy	and	water	supply	industries	have	chosen	Central	&	Eastern	Europe	
as	 the	place	 to	 test	 their	new	services	and	 software.	The	 survey	 shows	 that	
the	biggest	barriers	to	moving	elements	of	their	internal	activity	to	this	region	
are	questions	of	data	security	and	an	insufficient	knowledge	of	English	in	the	
region.	It	seems	to	be	in	the	interests	of	Central	Europe	to	support	the	trend	to	
move	the	business	process	outsourcing	services	of	German	companies	to	the	
region,	since	attracting	such	investments	may	offer	a	way	of	escaping	the	mid-
dle	income	trap,.	These	works	allow	high	added	value	to	be	moved	to	the	target	
countries	and	ensure	the	employment	of	highly	skilled	workers.
19	 Studie:	Osteuropa	gewinnt	Akzeptanz	beim	Outsourcing,	14	February	2012;	http://www.
presseportal.de/pm/50272/2198077
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3. The investment climate in the v4 countries from the perspective 
of german investors
Over	the	past	two	years,	the	investment	attractiveness	of	the	V4	countries	has	
increased	 considerably	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 German	 investors.	 In	 2014	 Poland	 ob-
tained	the	best	values	of	specific	indicators	for	investment	attractiveness.	Data	
from	 the	 surveys	 confirms	 that	 German	 investors’	 evaluation	 of	 Hungary’s	
economic	policy	were	much	higher	than	the	considerable	criticism	in	the	Ger-
man	press	would	suggest.	
Figure 19.	Evaluation	of	the	investment	attractiveness	of	the	V4	countries		
(1–best,	6–worst)
2013 2014 20152008 2009 2010 2011 2012
4.5
4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
Slovakia
Poland
Czech Republic
Hungary
source:	 Economic	 Survey	 in	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 2015,	 the	 German	 Chamber	 of	 Industry	 and	
Commerce;	http://www.ahkungarn.hu/fileadmin/ahk_ungarn/Dokumente/Bereich_CC/Publikationen/
Konjunktur/2015/AHK-Konjunkturumfrage_MOE_2015_final.pdf	
In	recent	years,	assessments	of	the	V4	countries’	investment	attractiveness	have	
clearly	improved.	In	the	period	2006-12	these	ratings	were	quite	stable;	the	leader	
was	Poland	(2.8),	the	Czech	Republic	(3),	Slovakia	(3.2)	and	Hungary	(3.6).	The	V4	
countries’	assessments	improved	significantly	in	2013,	which	may	have	been	the	
result	of	better	economic	conditions	in	those	countries	than	in	the	euro-zone.	It	
seems	that	German	investors	mostly	appreciated	the	greater	political	stability	
in	the	V4	countries	than	in	Western	countries,	as	well	as	their	 lower	levels	of	
debt	compared	to	Western	countries.	The	biggest	change	was	Poland’s	advance	
to	first	place	as	a	location	for	investments	as	of	2013,	as	well	as	the	worsening	
assessment	of	Hungary.	The	attractiveness	of	the	Hungarian	economy	deterio-
rated	in	2009,	so	even	before	Prime	Minister	Viktor	Orbán	came	to	power,	and	
did	so	again	in	the	third	year	of	his	rule.	The	poorer	perception	of	Hungary	is	not	
therefore	connected	only	to	 its	controversial	economic	policy,	but	rather	with	
the	overall	economic	situation,	linked	to	its	high	debt.	
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Figure 20.	The	percentage	of	German	companies	which	intend	to	increase	
investment	in	individual	countries	(%)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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source:	Economic	Survey	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	2015,	as	above	
Analysis	of	the	diagram	shows	that	the	percentage	of	companies	planning	to	in-
crease	investment	after	the	decline	in	2009	has	increased	and	remains	stable.	In	
recent	years,	around	a	third	of	the	companies	interviewed	intended	to	boost	in-
vestment.	Despite	the	weaker	rating	of	Hungary’s	attractiveness	in	the	data	cited	
earlier,	this	does	not	appear	to	have	affected	the	desire	to	invest.	In	this	respect,	
Hungary	does	not	differ	significantly	from	the	other	V4	states.	In	recent	years	
German	companies	have	been	slightly	more	 likely	 to	 increase	 investments	 in	
Hungary	than	in	Slovakia.	Poland	(39%)	exhibited	more	favourable	assessments	
than	Hungary	(35%),	the	Czech	Republic	(33%)	and	Slovakia	(30%).
Figure 21.	The	percentage	of	German	companies	which	intend	to	increase	
employment	in	individual	countries	(%)
20152008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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source:	Economic	Survey	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	2015,	as	above	
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In	terms	of	the	intention	to	increase	employment	in	the	V4	countries,	Poland	
received	 the	best	assessment,	an	 improvement	over	recent	years.	43%	of	 the	
companies	interviewed	intend	to	increase	employment	on	the	Polish	market,	
36%	in	the	Czech	Republic,	35%	in	Hungary,	and	33%	in	Slovakia.
Figure 22.	The	percentage	of	German	companies	which	support	the	introduc-
tion	of	the	euro	in	individual	countries	(percent)
20152009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
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source:	Economic	Survey	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	2015,	as	above.	
There	have	 been	 clear	 changes	with	 respect	 to	German	 investors’	 attitude	
towards	plans	 to	 introduce	 the	euro	 in	 those	 countries	of	 the	V4	which	do	
not	 yet	 use	 it.	 Support	 for	 this	 issue	 among	German	 companies	 has	 fallen	
significantly	in	the	Czech	Republic,	Poland	and	Hungary	to	similar	degrees,	
probably	as	a	result	of	the	crisis	in	the	monetary	union;	nevertheless,	a	slight	
majority	still	supports	 the	 introduction	of	 the	single	currency.	Whereas	 in	
2009	about	90%	of	interviewees	believed	the	adoption	of	the	euro	would	be	
beneficial	for	their	companies,	in	2014	the	percentage	was	only	slightly	more	
than	 50%.	This	may	mean	 that	 some	German	 companies	have	been	 taking	
advantage	of	the	V4	currencies	weakening	against	the	euro,	which	ensures	
additional	savings	for	them.
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Figure 23.	Investors’	assessments	of	individual	aspects	of	competitiveness:	
percentages	as	satisfactory	or	very	satisfactory	(%)
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source:	Economic	Survey	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	2015,	as	above
When	carrying	out	a	deeper	analysis	of	the	factors	that	meet	the	expectations	
of	German	companies,	it	is	worth	noting	the	strong	position	of	Poland,	which	
leads	the	way	in	all	categories.	Its	good	position	stems	primarily	from	the	qual-
ity	and	availability	of	its	human	capital.	Slovakia	compares	to	Poland	in	many	
categories,	although	it	shows	worse	performances	particularly	in	terms	of	aca-
demic	quality,	as	well	as	 (to	a	 lesser	extent)	 the	qualifications	of	 its	employ-
ees.	Hungary’s	results	are	lower	than	Slovakia	and	Poland;	German	investors	
appreciate	(in	Poland	and	Slovakia	to	similar	degrees)	only	Hungary’s	labour	
costs	and	its	accessibility	to	local	suppliers.	The	Czech	Republic	deviates	from	
the	other	countries	in	almost	all	categories.	Their	lower	position	may,	on	the	
one	hand,	arise	 from	German	 investors’	higher	expectations	of	 the	country,	
and	on	the	other	from	its	lower	economic	performance	in	recent	years.	
Figure 24.	Investors’	assessments	of	individual	aspects	of	competitiveness:	
percentages	as	unsatisfactory	or	very	unsatisfactory	(%)
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source:	Economic	Survey	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	2015,	as	above	
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From	the	analysis	of	the	factors	unsatisfactory	to	German	investors,	it	appears	
that	Poland	received	the	least	criticism.	Only	Hungary	is	evaluated	less	criti-
cally	 than	Poland	with	regard	to	 the	quality	of	 infrastructure.	The	other	V4	
countries	have	 similar	 ratings.	The	Czech	Republic	 and	Slovakia	 are	 judged	
by	a	higher	percentage	of	German	companies	to	be	worse	at	dealing	with	cor-
ruption	and	public	tenders,	state	administration	and	legal	security.	The	Czech	
Republic	is	also	criticised	for	its	substantial	problems	with	political	stability.	
Hungary	in	most	categories	is	not	rated	as	low	as	the	Czech	Republic	or	Slova-
kia,	but	from	the	point	of	view	of	German	investors,	it	is	assessed	most	criti-
cally	in	terms	of	the	predictability	of	its	economic	policy.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
44
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
06
/2
01
6
Iv.  The polITIcal prospecTs for economIc 
cooperaTIon
In	recent	years,	Germany’s	good	economic	performance	has	afforded	it	a	priv-
ileged	 position	 in	 Europe.	 It	 was	 no	 coincidence	 that	 Germany’s	 economy	
strengthened	significantly	after	the	accession	of	the	central	European	coun-
tries	to	the	European	Union.	The	guaranteed	security	and	economic	develop-
ment	in	the	region	meant	that	it	became	a	crucial	outlet	and	an	important	in-
vestment	destination	for	German	companies.	Its	importance	will	increase	in	
the	coming	years	due	to	political	instability	in	the	rest	of	the	world,	as	well	as	
the	need	to	overcome	three	key	crises	within	the	EU:	the	euro-zone,	the	Rus-
sian/Ukrainian	 conflict	 and	 the	migration	 crisis.	 Due	 to	 their	 geographical	
and	economic	importance	for	Germany,	the	countries	of	Central	Europe	will	
be	a	key	partner	in	addressing	these	issues.	It	seems	that	the	format	of	the	V4,	
which	has	proved	its	usefulness	in	the	battle	for	funds	for	the	EU	cohesion	pol-
icy,	and	over	the	shape	of	the	EU’s	energy	policy,	could	be	an	important	instru-
ment	to	defend	the	interests	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	especially	in	the	
debate	on	reforming	the	euro-zone,	 the	shape	of	the	EU’s	energy	policy,	and	
migration	issues.	
A	major	downside	to	the	economic	relations	between	Germany	and	Central	Eu-
rope	will	be	the	reform	of	the	euro-zone.	The	monetary	union’s	previous	correc-
tive	actions	have	been	inadequate,	and	will	not	ensure	its	sustainability	in	the	
long	term,	if	only	because	of	the	high	debt	many	countries	have	now.	A	number	
of	proposals	which	have	been	debated,	such	as	the	creation	of	a	separate	parlia-
ment	or	a	euro-zone	budget,	threaten	to	reduce	the	importance	of	previously	
existing	institutions	under	the	guise	of	building	new	ones.	This	could	lead	to	
the	exclusion	of	those	member	states	which	do	not	use	the	common	currency	
from	the	process	of	European	economic	integration,	or	to	the	infringement	of	
their	interests.	This	risk	has	been	highlighted	by	the	UK	government,	which	
in	exchange	for	remaining	in	the	EU	expects	that	the	integration	of	the	euro-
zone	will	not	lead	to	the	deterioration	of	conditions	for	development	in	those	
countries	which	are	not	members	of	the	zone.
Until	now,	Berlin	has	had	problems	clarifying	what	the	relationship	between	
the	countries	inside	the	euro-zone	and	those	outside	it	should	be	after	the	re-
form	process	is	over.	For	example,	some	reforms	to	the	monetary	union,	and	
in	particular	concerning	the	financial	sector,	may	affect	the	economies	of	the	
other	EU	member	states,	as	the	financial	institutions	from	the	euro-zone	have	
significant	shares	on	the	markets	of	the	Czech	Republic,	Poland	and	Hungary.	
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
45
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
6/
20
16
Thus	 these	 countries	will	 in	 effect	 become	members	 of	 the	 banking	 union,	
even	if	they	do	not	formally	participate.	The	global	financial	crisis	showed	that	
member	states’	excessive	dependence	on	banking	groups	from	other	countries	
carries	an	increased	risk	of	crises	being	transmitted	from	their	parent	coun-
tries	to	those	where	they	have	branches.	Worse	conditions	for	financing	busi-
nesses	may	thus	hinder	the	activities	of	German	companies	involved	in	Central	
Europe.	Germany	should	therefore	take	greater	account	of	the	interests	of	the	
region’s	countries	during	the	process	of	reforming	the	euro-zone.	Protecting	
euro-zone	 banks	 from	 bankruptcy	 should	 not	 be	 associated	 with	 subsidis-
ing	 them,	which	could	effectively	mean	giving	 them	unauthorised	state	aid,	
thus	making	it	easier	for	them	to	compete	on	the	V4	countries’	markets.	Such	
a	move	may	raise	doubts	 in	Central	Europe	as	 to	whether	 the	 liquidity	pro-
vided	to	banks	by	the	European	Central	Bank	interferes	with	the	mechanisms	
of	competition	on	the	banking	market,	and	thus	maintains	the	strong	position	
of	Western	Europe’s	institutions	in	Central	Europe.
We	may	also	imagine	a	situation	in	which	Berlin	needs	political	support	from	
Central	Europe.	The	 insistence	on	austerity	policies	 in	southern	Europe	has	
become	associated	with	significant	social	costs,	such	as	declining	incomes,	ris-
ing	unemployment	and	the	radicalisation	of	societies.	The	new	division	 into	
southern	 and	northern	 EU	 countries	 seems	 to	 have	 become	 settled,	 at	 least	
in	the	medium	term,	as	economic	interests	become	conditional	upon	levels	of	
public	debt.	Although	the	crisis	in	the	euro-zone	has	now	lasted	for	some	years,	
Germany’s	budgetary	 situation	has	 improved	 significantly,	 and	 it	now	more	
closely	resembles	that	of	the	countries	of	Central	Europe	rather	than	those	of	
the	south.	Germany	is	also	aware	that	the	European	Commission,	led	by	Jean-
-Claude	 Juncker,	plays	 the	role	of	a	political	actor,	and	not	simply	 that	of	an	
independent	guardian	of	the	treaties	which	is	supposed	to	oversee	fiscal	dis-
cipline	within	the	EU.	It	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	the	governments	of	France,	
Spain,	Portugal	or	 Italy	may	decide	to	 limit	 the	 implementation	of	austerity,	
which	will	fate	them	to	a	confrontation	with	Berlin.	In	this	scenario,	Germany	
will	seek	allies	in	Europe	to	pursue	the	austerity	policy.	The	countries	of	Cen-
tral	Europe	appear	to	be	the	natural	choice	for	this,	together	with	the	countries	
of	Northern	Europe.	
In	recent	years,	energy	policy	and	climate	change	have	become	an	important	
axis	of	the	dispute	between	Germany	and	the	central	European	countries.	The	
reason	for	this,	on	the	one	hand,	was	Berlin’s	desire	to	promote	an	ambitious	
climate	policy	in	Europe	and	around	the	world,	in	which	it	saw	a	chance	to	sup-
port	the	renewable	energy	sector	in	Germany,	and	to	meet	public	expectations	
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on	restricting	the	use	of	nuclear	and	coal	plants	in	energy	production.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	German	government	has	not	displayed	a	full	understanding	
of	the	structural	conditions	in	the	countries	of	Central	Europe,	whose	energy	
balance	is	based	on	conventional	fuel	sources	(including	nuclear	energy),	and	
which	do	not	have	enough	funds	to	subsidise	renewable	energy	sources.	In	ad-
dition,	after	the	sudden	shutdown	of	some	nuclear	power	plants	in	Germany	
in	2011,	there	were	uncontrolled	flows	of	renewable	energy	from	German	off-
shore	wind	farms,	which	caused	problems	with	the	stability	of	the	energy	net-
works	in	the	Czech	Republic	and	Poland.	
It	seems	that	there	may	be	a	chance	to	bring	the	positions	of	Germany	and	Cen-
tral	Europe	in	the	area	of	energy	policy	closer	together	over	the	next	few	years.	
There	seems	to	be	ever	less	determination	within	the	EU	to	implement	a	strict	
climate	policy,	and	increasing	importance	is	being	attached	to	industrial	pol-
icy.	This	trend	may	be	enhanced	by	the	low	prices	of	energy	carriers	around	
the	world,	as	well	as	by	the	process	of	reindustrialisation	in	the	United	States.	
Many	 EU	 countries	 will	 long	 continue	 to	 use	 conventional	 energy	 sources;	
for	example,	the	United	Kingdom	intends	to	build	a	new	nuclear	power	plant.	
Moreover,	decreases	in	the	price	of	oil	and	gas	on	the	global	market	also	clearly	
favour	such	a	trend.	The	situation	in	Germany	is	no	exception;	Berlin	still	has	
no	idea	how	to	replace	a	significant	amount	of	the	power	which	had	been	gen-
erated	by	coal.	Recent	decisions	by	the	German	government,	such	as	limiting	
the	amount	of	subsidies	for	renewable	energy,	as	well	as	subsidising	coal	in	re-
turn	for	keeping	it	as	reserve	stocks,	show	that	the	German	economy	may	not	
be	able	to	bear	the	costs	of	a	too	rapid	energy	transformation	related	to	the	im-
plementation	of	the	EU’s	climate	goals.	Therefore	the	chance	for	an	agreement	
between	Germany	and	the	V4	countries	is	growing.	We	may	imagine	a	solution	
in	which	the	countries	of	Western	Europe,	thanks	to	their	financial	capabili-
ties,	maintain	large	capacities	of	renewable	energy,	whereas	the	countries	of	
Central	Europe	could	stabilise	the	energy	system	in	the	EU	thanks	to	the	sig-
nificant	capacity	of	their	conventional	power	plants.	
More	problematic	than	differences	in	the	field	of	climate	policy,	however,	may	
be	the	difference	between	Germany	and	the	V4	countries	over	the	issue	of	di-
versifying	gas	 supplies.	 In	 2015	Central	Europe	was	once	 again	 surprised	 to	
learn	that	Gazprom,	together	with	German	and	French	companies,	was	plan-
ning	to	add	another	branch	to	the	Nord	Stream	gas	pipeline.	This	was	an	even	
bigger	surprise	as	the	EU	had	in	recent	years	demanded	a	greater	diversifica-
tion	of	energy	suppliers,	a	postulate	supported	by	Germany.	Forecasts	suggest	
that	expanding	Nord	Stream	would	only	make	economic	sense	if	it	is	exempted	
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from	the	EU’s	energy	legislation	and	Russian	companies	are	able	to	use	its	en-
tire	capacity.	Even	now	the	project	is	raising	concern	in	the	countries	of	Cen-
tral	Europe,	because	it	will	deprive	some	of	them	of	the	profits	from	gas	transit,	
and	it	also	involves	the	risk	of	making	gas	supplies	to	the	region	less	certain.	
If	migration	is	the	process	which	most	affects	European	policy	over	the	next	
few	years,	it	may	also	be	a	factor	which	strongly	consolidates	the	V4	countries	
in	other	cases.	These	countries’	attitude	may	conflict	with	the	interests	of	Ger-
many,	 if	 it	 continues	 to	 insist	on	admitting	a	 large	number	of	migrants	and	
redistributing	them	among	EU	countries.	In	the	long	term,	however,	it	seems	
unlikely	that	Berlin	will	carry	out	such	a	policy,	due	to	the	growing	resistance	
of	the	German	public.	The	German	government	must	also	be	aware	that	a	too	
liberal	migration	 policy	may	 induce	migration	 pressure	 on	 the	 countries	 of	
Central	Europe,	which	have	already	been	exposed	to	a	significant	influx	of	peo-
ple	as	a	result	of	the	Russia/Ukraine	conflict.	Such	processes	could	therefore	
lead	to	political	and	social	problems	that	would	adversely	affect	the	economy.
An	important	role	in	shaping	the	political	and	economic	relationship	between	
Germany	 and	 the	 V4	 countries	 will	 be	 played	 by	 public	 opinion.	 In	 recent	
years,	German	newspapers	and	experts	have	been	focused	on	the	problems	of	
southern	Europe,	which	has	reduced	their	interest	in	Central	Europe.	Public	
opinion	in	Germany	is	unaware	of	the	degree	to	which	the	region’s	economic	
relations	with	Germany	have	developed.	Since	the	start	of	the	migration	crisis,	
many	German	politicians	have	tried	to	persuade	the	member	states	of	Central	
Europe	to	change	their	migration	policy	by	threatening	to	withdraw	EU	fund-
ing,	while	German	companies	are	among	the	biggest	beneficiaries	of	contracts	
financed	from	the	structural	 funds.	The	German	media	have	been	speculat-
ing	on	the	possibility	that	the	Schengen	area	will	be	limited	to	Germany	and	
the	Benelux	states.	One	of	the	biggest	losers	from	such	a	solution	would	be	the	
German	automotive	sector,	whose	ability	to	transport	to	&	from	their	factories	
located	in	Central	Europe	would	be	hampered.	These	examples	show	increas-
ingly	clearly	that	there	is	not	enough	awareness	in	Germany	of	its	economic	
dependency	with	the	region	of	Central	Europe.	This	also	results	from	the	re-
striction	of	funds	to	finance	research	and	expertise	concerning	the	region20.	
20	 The	example	of	Budapest	says	a	lot,	as	some	of	the	German	interlocutors	interviewed	in	Hun-
gary	stated	that	the	media	in	Germany	had	reacted	too	emotionally	to	the	political	process-
es	taking	place	in	this	country.	The	misunderstanding	of	the	situation	was	compounded	by	
the	lack	of	real	knowledge;	the	subject	had	often	been	raised	by	German	correspondents	from	
Vienna.
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v. appendIX 
The InvolvemenT of german companIes In selecTed 
secTors In The member sTaTes of The vIsegrad group
1.  The automotive sector
The	automotive	sector	has,	next	to	the	machine	sector,	been	a	major	source	of	
export	competitiveness	for	the	German	economy	in	recent	years.	An	important	
role	has	been	played	in	this	process	by	the	countries	of	Central	Europe,	which	
have	 become	 a	 focal	 point	 for	 car	 production,	 bringing	 together	 the	world’s	
most	important	manufacturers	and	suppliers.	Most	German	companies	dur-
ing	this	period	decided	to	limit	production	in	Western	Europe,	and	increase	it	
in	Central	Europe.
The	financial	crisis	has	verified	many	previously	existing	economic	tenets,	in-
cluding	 the	 idea	 that	 an	economy	can	only	be	based	on	 the	financial	 sector.	
Many	economists	have	deemed	Germany	to	be	a	good	model	to	follow;	in	recent	
years	its	economy	has	been	characterised	by	high	growth	dynamics,	a	strong	
industrial	base,	a	flexible	labour	market	and	high	trade	surpluses.	One	of	the	
major	factors	for	stable	economic	development	was	the	good	condition	of	the	
automotive	sector.	In	2013,	5.4	million	cars	were	produced	in	the	factories	of	
German	corporations	in	Germany,	and	8.6	million	abroad21.	Until	the	financial	
crisis,	car	production	in	Germany	exceeded	the	number	produced	abroad,	but	
after	2010	this	ratio	was	reversed.	German	automotive	companies	are	distin-
guished	by	 the	share	of	parts	manufactured	abroad	 throughout	 the	produc-
tion.	The	companies	which	manufacture	most	parts	overseas	are	Volkswagen	
(79%),	then	Audi	(53%),	Daimler	(40%)	and	least	of	all	BMW	(36%)22.	
Together	with	China,	Central	Europe	 is	one	of	 the	most	 important	 locations	
for	vehicle	production.	In	total,	throughout	Central	Europe	(the	V4,	Romania	
and	Slovenia)	33	plants	operate,	producing	3.6	million	vehicles,	representing	
21%	of	EU	production.	The	bulk	of	those	cars	are	sold	on	the	market	of	Western	
21	 E.	Heymann,	Zukunft	des	Automobilstandorts	in	Deutschland,	2014;	https://www.dbre-
search.de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD/PROD0000000000333574/Zukunft	+	des	+	Au-
tomobilstandorts	+	URDeutschland.PDF
22	 W.	Olle,	Investitionen	folgen	dem	Wachstum:	Auswirkungen	auf	den	Automobilstandort	
Deutschland,	Chemnitz	Automotive	Institute,	2015;	http://cati.institute/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/07/URKurzstudie_Juni_15.pdf,	p.	16.
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Europe,	and	only	approximately	700,000	are	purchased	by	consumers	in	Cen-
tral	Europe23.	Among	German	car	companies,	Volkswagen	and	Audi	have	the	
most	manufacturing	plants	in	Central	Europe.	Only	BMW	has	no	factories	in	
the	region.	Central	Europe	occupies	a	special	position	in	the	German	automo-
tive	industry.	Typically,	businesses	in	this	field	invest	abroad	in	order	to	pro-
duce	 for	 local	markets;	however,	 their	 investments	 in	Central	Europe	are	 to	
a	large	extent	aimed	at	reducing	production	costs24.
As	early	as	the	1990s,	automotive	companies	invested	significant	resources	in	
Central	Europe,	as	 they	could	see	the	advantages	of	 these	countries,	such	as	
stable	political	frameworks,	geographical	proximity	and	strong	industrial	tra-
ditions.	In	recent	years,	there	has	been	a	clear	tendency	to	build	up	plants	in	
Central	Europe	as	a	key	element	in	the	German	corporations’	supply	chain,	to	
the	cost	of	countries	 in	southern	Europe	in	particular.	 In	recent	years,	Audi	
has	built	a	new	line	of	cars	in	Győr,	Daimler	a	factory	in	Kecskemét,	Volkswa-
gen	an	assembly	line	of	compact	cars	at	its	plant	in	Slovakia,	and	will	soon	com-
plete	the	construction	of	a	factory	in	Poznan.	Opel	(one	of	the	largest	American	
companies	in	Germany,	which	has	three	production	facilities	there)	has	moved	
the	production	of	one	of	its	models	from	Rüsselheim	to	Gliwice.	For	German	
companies,	moving	factories	to	Central	Europe	was	an	opportunity	to	reduce	
production	costs,	which	was	an	important	competitive	advantage,	especially	in	
the	period	of	global	economic	downturn	in	the	world,	in	which	customers	have	
attached	great	 importance	to	the	price	of	cars.	Moving	ever	more	important	
production	phases	to	Central	Europe	could	also	motivate	companies	to	move	
some	of	 their	R&D	facilities	 to	this	region;	 it	would	be	most	advantageous	 if	
those	processes	were	closer	to	the	production	sites.	An	additional	incentive	for	
German	companies	to	expand	their	activities	in	Central	Europe	is	the	growth	
in	the	region	of	a	whole	cluster	of	automotive	companies,	which	have	been	in-
vested	in	by	companies	such	as	Hyundai/KIA	in	the	Czech	Republic,	Peugeot/
Citroën	in	Slovakia,	Suzuki	in	Hungary	and	Fiat	in	Poland.	Thanks	to	the	pres-
ence	of	the	most	important	global	automotive	producers	in	the	region,	there	
are	no	problems	with	the	availability	of	suppliers.	Many	companies	in	the	sec-
tor	collaborate	with	the	German	automotive	companies	as	subcontractors.	For	
example,	Bosch	has	factories	in	Hungary	which	produce	car	parts.	
23	 S.	Mittelhäuser,	 FDI	 als	Motor	 für	 die	 Autoindustrie	 in	 Osteuropa,	 2015;	 https://owc.
de/2015/07/22/fdi-als-motor-fuer-die-autoindustrie-in-/osteuropa
24	 W.	Olle,	Investitionen	folgen	dem	Wachstum:	Auswirkungen	auf	den	Automobilstandort	
Deutschland,	Chemnitz	Automotive	Institute,	2015;	http://cati.institute/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/07/URKurzstudie_Juni_15.pdf,	p.	4.
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The	threat	to	move	jobs	to	Central	Europe	played	an	important	role	in	negotia-
tions	with	the	trade	unions	in	the	automotive	sector.	It	is	worth	noting	that	in	
the	last	decade,	Germany	has	kept	its	rises	in	labour	costs	relatively	small,	and	
the	threat	of	losing	German	jobs	to	Central	Europe	has	been	widely	reported	in	
the	media.	In	fear	of	these	processes,	the	German	trade	unions	presented	fairly	
low	wage	demands,	and	preferred	to	make	agreements	with	employers	which	
would	ensure	that	jobs	were	saved.	The	businesses	applied	a	strategy	of	encour-
aging	competition	between	plants	 to	produce	specific	models.	The	question	of	
the	sale	of	Opel	by	General	Motors	in	2009	also	had	great	resonance	in	Germany;	
this	transaction	(which	in	the	end	did	not	come	to	fruition)	was	described	in	the	
press	as	threatening	thousands	of	jobs	in	Germany,	and	even	Chancellor	Angela	
Merkel	weighed	 in	on	 the	matter.	Many	car	 companies	with	headquarters	 in	
Germany	deliberately	chose	a	strategy	of	constructing	plants	in	Central	Europe	
which	were	effectively	 twins	of	 their	counterparts	 in	Germany,	which	would	
have	been	capable	of	quickly	taking	over	the	production	of	car	models	if	there	
was	no	agreement	with	the	trade	unionists	from	factories	in	Germany.
The	 data	 shows	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 car	 production	 in	 Central	 Europe	 has	
harmed	the	industry	in	southern	Europe.	In	recent	years,	many	of	the	automo-
tive	companies	remaining	in	those	countries	have	not	been	fully	utilising	their	
capacity,	and	Italy	today	produces	half	as	many	cars	as	Slovakia.	In	the	period	
2003-12	the	production	of	cars	in	eastern	Europe	(including	Russia)	increased	
by	2.5	million;	during	the	same	period,	the	number	of	cars	produced	in	the	EU-
15	fell	by	3.5	million,	with	the	biggest	decline	in	the	years	2008-1225.	This	pro-
cess	only	affected	Germany	to	a	limited	extent,	where	production	levels	have	
remained	relatively	stable.	
2. The electro-mechanical sector
The	electro-mechanical	field	is	the	second	most	important	sector	in	the	Ger-
man	economy	after	the	automotive	industry.	The	V4	countries	are	quite	impor-
tant	subsidiaries	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	biggest	German	electro-mechan-
ical	companies,	and	their	prospects	for	developing	cooperation	are	favourable.	
Many	of	the	companies	in	this	 industry	are	committed	to	Central	Europe	as	
a	subcontractor	for	car	companies.	
25	 Verband	der	Automobilindustrie	[Automotive	Industry	Association];	https://www.vda.de/de
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Germany’s	electro-mechanical	companies,	in	contrast	to	its	automobile	compa-
nies,	decided	not	to	move	their	production	of	advanced	goods	to	Central	Europe,	
and	have	preferred	to	focus	on	manufacturing	the	machines’	simplest	compo-
nents	in	the	region26,	and	keeping	the	most	important	production	processes	in	
Germany.	Due	 to	 the	demographic	decline	 in	Germany,	as	well	as	 the	 limited	
capacity	of	the	German	labour	market	to	train	a	sufficient	number	of	engineers,	
their	interest	in	creating	branches	in	the	V4	countries	should	rise.	It	is	also	pos-
sible	that	the	companies’	internal	processes,	such	as	accounting	or	procurement	
services,	could	be	farmed	out	to	service	providers	from	Central	Europe.	How-
ever,	there	would	be	a	number	of	difficulties	with	coordinating	them,	such	as	
missing	deadlines,	or	the	quality	of	the	services	provided	being	too	low.	These	
companies	count	on	the	possibility	of	winning	contracts	in	Central	Europe	over	
the	next	 few	years	 from	 funding	 to	modernise	 the	energy	 sector,	 such	as	EU	
structural	funds,	the	EU’s	Connecting	Europe	fund,	the	European	Investment	
Bank,	 or	 the	Horizon	2020	programme27.	The	activity	of	 the	German	electro-
mechanical	companies	in	Central	Europe	can	be	traced	back	to	the	example	of	
Bosch/Siemens,	which	owns	the	Siemens	and	Bosch	companies.	
Table 2.	Income	and	employment	at	selected	branches	of	Siemens	in	2014
country Turnover (€ billion) number of employees (thousands)
germany 10.9 115
usa 12.9 46.3
china 6.4 32.3
czech republic 0.5 9
france 1.6 6.4
spain 1.0 3.2
russia 1.7 3.1
poland 0.8 1.3
slovakia 0.3 1.3
hungary (no data) - -
source:	www.siemens.com
26	 Strategische	Planung	bringt	Einsparungen	bis	15%;	http://www.beschaffung-aktuell.de/
home/-/article/16537505/26961417/Strategische-Planung-bringt-Einsparungen-bis-15%25/
art_co_INSTANCE_0000/maximized/
27	 Osteuropa	glänzt	teilweise	mit	starken	Wachstumszahlen,	2015;	http://www.ke-next.de/in-
dustrie/osteuropa-glaenzt-mit-teilweise-starken-wachstumszahlen-358.html
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Siemens	employs	approximately	343,000	employees	worldwide,	and	its	turno-
ver	is	€72	billion.	The	Czech	Republic,	Poland	and	Slovakia	are	responsible	for	
2.2%	of	its	turnover	and	3.4%	of	its	employment.	The	company’s	branches	in	the	
region	are	not	its	largest	and	employ	relatively	few	people,	with	the	exception	
of	the	Czech	Republic.	So	far	it	does	not	seem	that	the	V4	countries	will	be	the	
future	 location	 for	 Siemens	plants,	 because	 the	 company	has	 previously	 only	
been	interested	in	employing	significant	numbers	of	workers	in	Germany	and	
the	largest	global	markets,	such	as	China	and	the	United	States.	The	example	of	
the	Czech	Republic,	however,	shows	that	Siemens’s	employment	in	V4	countries	
may	rise	due	to	the	growing	demand	for	engineers,	of	which	the	German	labour	
market	no	longer	provides	a	sufficient	number.	This	is	confirmed	by	Siemens’s	
operations	such	as	the	construction	in	2010	in	Žilina	of	an	engineering	centre,	
and	the	creation	of	research	units	in	Łódź	and	Warsaw.	The	V4	countries	may	
also	benefit	from	Siemens’s	 interest	due	to	their	significant	 investment	 in	ur-
ban	energy	and	modernisation	projects	financed	from	EU	funds.	Among	other	
moves,	Siemens	has	in	recent	years	participated	in	the	modernisation	of	power	
plants	in	the	Czech	Republic,	Poland	and	Slovakia.	In	addition,	the	company	may	
move	to	Central	Europe	some	of	the	services	that	will	be	implemented	there	for	
other	global	branches	as	a	whole,	as	evidenced	by	 the	 transfer	of	 some	of	 the	
company’s	accounting	tasks	for	Europe	to	Slovakia	in	2011.	Another	new	trend	in	
Siemens’s	activity	in	Central	Europe	is	its	joint	involvement	with	Polish	produc-
ers	in	acquiring	contracts	abroad,	including	Russia.	
Table 3.	Income	and	employment	of	selected	Bosch	affiliates	in	2014
country Turnover (€ billion) number of employees (thousands)
germany 49 105.5
china 7.2 54.5
usa 9.1 16.6
hungary 2.7 10.4
france 2.3 7.7
czech republic 1.6 7.7
poland 0.6 4.2
russia 0.7 3.8
slovakia 0.3 1
source:	www.bosch.com
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In	the	case	of	Bosch,	Central	Europe	has	been	quite	a	significant	place	for	in-
vestment.	 The	 company’s	 branches	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 and	Hungary	 are	
among	the	largest	in	the	world	in	terms	of	employment.	Bosch	employs	a	large	
number	of	workers,	although	they	generate	a	relatively	small	turnover,	which	
means	that	products	are	manufactured	here	to	be	exported	onto	other	mar-
kets.	As	in	the	case	of	Siemens,	Bosch	may	also	be	expected	to	further	increase	
its	employment,	especially	of	engineers,	in	plants	located	in	the	V4	countries.	
An	important	event	in	Europe	for	the	Bosch-Siemens	Group	was	the	acquisi-
tion	in	2013	of	Zelmer,	an	appliances	manufacturer	in	Poland.	The	main	reason	
for	the	acquisition	was	probably	to	increase	production	in	Europe	in	the	face	of	
increasing	costs.
3. The logistics sector
One	of	the	relatively	little-known	facts	related	to	the	accession	of	the	Central	
European	countries	to	the	European	Union	was	the	remarkable	development	
of	the	German	logistics	industry.	In	recent	years	it	has	grown	much	faster	than	
the	economy	as	a	whole;	in	the	period	2003-8,	revenue	increased	by	4.6%	an-
nually,	whereas	the	average	growth	has	slowed	to	3.4%	over	recent	years.	The	
growing	complexity	of	the	manufacture	of	products	and	the	distribution	of	the	
stages	of	the	process	among	different	regions	means	that	the	logistics	industry	
has	gained	more	than	average.	An	important	reason	for	this,	in	addition	to	the	
high	growth	of	global	trade,	was	Germany’s	adoption	after	EU	enlargement	of	
the	position	as	 the	central	 logistics	hub,	an	 important	 intermediate	point	 in	
trade	between	East	and	West,	especially	in	the	fields	of	rail	and	maritime	trans-
port.	The	logistics	companies	have	benefited,	above	all,	from	the	transport	of	
components	and	raw	materials	from	the	emerging	economies	to	the	factories	
of	German	companies	in	Central	Europe,	so	they	can	cash	in	once	more	from	
the	transport	of	finished	products	going	in	the	opposite	direction,	or	to	eastern	
Europe.	Many	German	logistics	companies	have	decided	to	open	branches	in	
the	countries	of	central	and	eastern	Europe,	as	this	was	part	of	a	natural	pro-
cess	of	bringing	the	services	for	their	clients	from	the	German	automotive	and	
electro-mechanical	 industries.	Given	 these	phenomena,	we	 can	 see	 that	 the	
German	logistics	industry	has	been	a	major	beneficiary	of	the	development	of	
infrastructure	in	Central	Europe	financed	by	the	EU’s	cohesion	policy.	
4. The energy sector
German	energy	companies	are	still	important	players	on	the	V4	markets,	al-
though	in	recent	times	their	position	has	begun	to	wane.	The	German	energy	
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transformation,	which	accelerated	in	2011	after	the	disaster	at	the	power	plant	
in	 Fukushima,	 forced	 the	 closure	 of	 the	 oldest	 nuclear	 power	 stations	 and	
their	gradual	phasing	out	from	the	market	by	2023,	the	granting	of	significant	
funding	for	renewable	energy,	and	favouring	its	access	 to	 the	network.	This	
overlaps	with	the	negative	economic	situation	in	Europe,	where	the	demand	
for	electricity	has	noticeably	dropped;	this	has	reduced	the	profits	of	German	
companies,	which	in	addition	have	to	contend	with	high	levels	of	debt.	These	
processes	have	undermined	the	position	and	profitability	of	leading	German	
companies,	such	as	E.ON	and	RWE,	whose	main	source	of	income	was	the	pro-
duction	of	energy	from	conventional	sources,	namely	nuclear	power,	gas	and	
coal28.	Due	to	these	companies’	difficult	financial	situation,	Central	Europe	be-
came	a	source	for	them	to	generate	funds	by	selling	part	of	their	assets.	The	
difficult	financial	situation	also	meant	they	did	not	have	the	resources	to	in-
crease	their	investments	in	the	region,	and	have	been	unable	to	improve	their	
market	situation.	They	have	made	investments	in	recent	years	only	to	make	
savings.	For	example,	RWE	decided	to	move	some	jobs	from	Germany	to	Poland	
as	part	of	its	financial	savings29,	opening	a	joint	service	centre	in	Kraków	in	
2013,	where	financial	settlement	and	human	resources	management	are	car-
ried	out.	Initially	100	specialists	were	employed	there,	which	was	associated	
with	redundancies	 in	Germany.	E.ON,	 like	RWE,	decided	 to	 save	on	staffing	
costs	by	moving	part	of	the	company’s	activity	to	Cluj-Napoca	in	Romania.	Ger-
man	energy	companies	have	also	struggled	with	difficulties	in	Hungary;	they	
were	forced	to	sell	their	assets	in	the	gas	sector	to	the	Hungarian	government,	
and	were	also	stricken	by	the	financial	effects	of	the	Hungarian	government	
bodies’	decision	to	lower	energy	and	gas	prices	by	20%30.	Despite	the	German	
energy	companies’	conflict	with	the	government	in	Budapest,	however,	they	
have	retained	their	most	important	assets	on	the	Hungarian	market.	
From	an	analysis	of	the	situation	of	the	German	energy	companies,	it	appears	
that	their	position	in	Central	Europe	has	weakened	in	recent	years.	RWE	has	
focused	its	main	venture	in	Central	Europe	on	the	holding	company	RWE	East,	
which	in	addition	to	the	V4	countries	includes	Croatia,	Romania	and	Turkey.	
28	 R.	Bajczuk,	K.	Popławski,	Niemcy:	Ukryte	koszty	wyjścia	z	atomu	[The	hidden	costs	of	ditch-
ing	nuclear	power], Komentarze OSW,	25	June	2014;	http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
komentarze-osw/2014-06-25/niemcy-ukryte-koszty-wyjscia-z-atomu
29	 RWE	verlagert	Stellen	nach	Krakau,	Die Welt,	15	May	2013;	http://www.welt.de/newstick-
er/dpa_nt/infoline_nt/wirtschaft_nt/article116214659/RWE-verlagert-Stellen-nach-
Krakau.html
30	 RWE	and	E.ON	selling	up	in	Hungary,	28	March	2013;	http://www.powerengineeringint.
com/articles/2013/03/RWE-and-EON-selling-up-in-Hungary.html
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The	 V4	 countries,	 however,	 yield	 the	 predominant	 part	 of	 its	 revenues	 and	
profits.	In	the	Czech	Republic,	RWE	gains	the	most	revenue	from	among	the	V4	
countries.	It	is	the	fifth	largest	supplier	of	energy	there	(2	TWh)	and	the	larg-
est	supplier	of	gas	(38	TWh);	it	also	owns	some	power	plants.	The	company	also	
controls	88%	of	gas	networks	in	this	country	(with	a	total	pipeline	length	of	
64,000	km).	In	the	Czech	Republic,	RWE	has	sold	its	company	Net4Gas,	which	
sold	and	stored	gas	from	the	Allianz	and	Borealis	consortium,	as	well	as	35%	
of	its	shares	in	the	electricity	network	company	Macquarie.	In	Poland,	RWE	
is	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 foreign	 investors;	 it	 is	 the	fifth	 largest	 energy	 supplier	
(6	TWh/year),	and	entered	the	gas	sector	in	2014.	In	Poland,	RWE	has	numer-
ous	wind	farms,	and	via	the	company	RWE	Stoen	Operator	it	controls	1.8%	of	
the	 country’s	 transmission	 networks	 (15,000	 km).	 One	 feature	 distinguish-
ing	RWE’s	activity	in	Poland	from	the	other	V4	countries	is	the	establishment	
there	of	six	wind	farms	through	its	company	RWE	Innogy,	which	mainly	oper-
ates	in	Western	Europe31.	In	Slovakia,	RWE	is	the	third	largest	energy	supplier	
(3	TWh)	and	the	second	largest	supplier	of	gas	(13	TWh).	The	company	controls	
22.8%	of	energy	networks	 in	Slovakia	 (with	a	 length	of	21,000	km).	 In	Hun-
gary,	RWE	is	the	second	largest	energy	supplier	(10	TWh),	and	is	the	majority	
shareholder	of	several	brown-coal	power	plants	in	this	country.	The	company	
no	longer	has	shares	in	the	gas	sector,	as	it	sold	its	minority	share	packages	to	
the	TIGAZ	businesses.	RWE	has	sold	its	shares	in	the	Budapest	Waterworks.	In	
2014,	RWE	sold	the	Főgáz	company	to	the	state-owned	MVM	company.
As	in	the	case	of	the	RWE,	E.ON	was	also	forced	to	sell	many	of	its	important	
assets	 in	Central	Europe.	E.ON	began	 its	operation	 In	 the	Czech	Republic	 in	
2004.	After	the	deregulation	of	the	Czech	market,	the	company	acquired	a	sig-
nificant	stake	in	it	thanks	to	privatisation.	It	currently	holds	19.5%	of	the	shares	
(10.2	TWh	of	energy,	second	after	the	state-owned	ČEZ)	on	the	internal	elec-
tricity	market,	and	7.5%	in	the	gas	sector	(6.6	TWh).	The	company	ranks	among	
the	 largest	 foreign	 investors	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic,	 employing	 2500	 work-
ers.	E.ON	also	owns	27.6%	of	the	Czech	Republic’s	electricity	networks	(with	
a	 length	of	66,000	km)	and	12.1%	of	the	gas	networks	(with	a	 length	of	8800	
km).	 Interestingly,	 in	2015	E.ON	sold	 its	 interests	 in	power	plants	 in	 Italy	 to	
the	Czech	firm	EPH.	In	Poland,	E.ON’s	assets	are	minor;	through	the	company	
E.ON	Edis	Energy,	it	holds	shares	in	the	distribution	of	heating	for	cities	such	
as	Skarżysko-Kamienna,	Szczecin	and	Warsaw.	In	addition,	the	company	has	
built	five	wind	farms	in	Poland,	generating	a	total	of	99	MW,	and	plans	to	build	
31	 RWE	Innogy	generation	data;	http://rwe-renewableslive.com/#/map/EU/PP1
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two	more.	E.ON	began	operating	in	Slovakia	in	2002,	and	has	a	49%	stake	in	the	
largest	energy	distributor	ZSE	(the	rest	is	owned	by	the	state	fund).	E.ON	sells	
21.9%	of	Slovakia’s	energy	(6	TWh)	and	1.4%	of	its	gas	(0.8	TWh),	controls	40.2%	
of	 the	energy	network	 (length	37,000	km),	 and	also	has	one	gas-fuelled	and	
four	biogas-fuelled	power	plants	 in	 the	country.	The	company	employs	 1800	
workers	in	Slovakia.	In	2013,	E.ON	and	GDF	Suez	sold	its	shares	in	the	Slovak	
gas	company	to	the	Czech	company	EPH,	which	it	had	acquired	in	the	process	
of	privatization	in	2002,	and	which	employs	4000	workers.	In	2014,	the	same	
company	sold	its	shares	in	gas	reservoirs	in	Slovakia.	In	Hungary,	E.ON	is	one	
of	the	largest	companies,	providing	clients	with	33.2%	of	the	country’s	energy	
(35.2	TWh)	and	10.4%	of	its	gas	(9.1	TWh).	The	company	also	owns	52%	of	Hun-
gary’s	energy	distribution	networks	(84,000	km)	and	22%	of	its	gas	networks	
(18,000	km).	In	recent	years,	E.ON	has	sold	part	of	its	stake	on	the	Hungarian	
market.	In	2013,	it	sold	the	Földgáz	company	(which	distributes	and	stores	gas)	
to	the	state	company	in	the	MVM	group	for	€1.1	billion;	it	had	acquired	Földgáz	
in	the	privatisation	process	in	2004	for	€2.1	billion.
5. The retail sector
German	companies	from	the	retail	sector	have	been	steadily	expanding	their	
presence	in	the	V4	countries,	which	constitute	an	important	market	for	them.	
In	recent	years,	the	expansion	of	the	retail	trade	has	aroused	great	controversy	
in	all	the	V4	countries;	the	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia	and	Hungary	have	begun	
attempting	to	impose	certain	restrictions	on	the	industry.	However,	these	new	
restrictions	have	not	discouraged	companies	from	Germany	from	increasing	
their	investment	in	the	region.	Three	financial	groups	may	be	named	as	the	
major	German	players	present	in	the	V4	countries:	Schwarz	AG	(including	the	
Lidl	and	Kaufland	stores),	Metro	AG	(Makro	Cash	&	Carry,	Media	Markt	and	
Saturn),	and	the	retail	chain	Rossmann.	
Table 4.	The	number	of	Lidl	stores	in	selected	countries
country lidl Kaufland
germany 3300 640
france 1400  
united Kingdom 568  
spain 530  
poland 525 190
Italy 511  
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country lidl Kaufland
netherlands 400  
belgium 290  
czech republic 250 120
romania 148  
slovakia 121 50
hungary 116  
source:	Lidl,	https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lidl#cite_note-52
In	2015	Schwarz	AG	overtook	Carrefour	as	 the	 largest	retail	company	in	Eu-
rope.	Central	Europe	has	played	an	important	role	in	the	company’s	develop-
ment,	because	it	is	located	in	a	large	number	of	establishments	(about	10%	of	
the	Lidl	branches	worldwide	and	30%	of	the	Kaufland	outlets32).	In	view	of	the	
favourable	 prospects	 for	 growth	 in	 the	 V4	 countries,	 the	 company	 plans	 to	
boost	its	investments	there.	In	2013,	the	V4	countries	generated	about	10%	of	
Lidl’s	total	sales	(€54	billion)33.	In	Poland,	Lidl’s	shops	sold	goods	with	a	value	
of	€2.7	billion	euros;	in	the	Czech	Republic	€1.1	billion,	in	Slovakia	€800	million	
euros,	and	in	Hungary	€700	million34.	
It	 is	possible	that	Lidl’s	 low	sales	in	Hungary	resulted	from	Budapest’s	policy	of	
blocking	the	expansion	of	foreign	retailers.	In	2015	the	country’s	authorities	re-
jected	Lidl’s	appeal	to	build	28	new	supermarkets35.	Foreign	retail	chains	have	also	
criticised	the	decision	of	the	Hungarian	government	to	ban	trading	on	Sunday,	as	
well	as	the	threat	to	close	supermarkets	which	have	shown	losses	for	two	consecu-
tive	years.	In	previous	years	the	government	imposed	a	‘crisis	tax’	on	the	foreign	
chains	(between	2010	and	2013),	a	fee	for	official	monitoring	of	foodstuffs	(in	the	
form	of	a	tax	on	the	sale	of	food	products),	as	well	as	a	tax	on	advertising	revenues.	
Hungary	was	not	the	only	country	which	tried	to	impose	greater	requirements	
on	foreign	retail	networks;	a	similar	debate	took	place	in	Slovakia.	It	was	reported	
there	that	foreign	commercial	networks	only	sold	45%	local	products	in	hypermar-
kets	and	51%	in	supermarkets,	while	in	Slovak	chains	these	figures	ranged	from	
32	 From	Kaufland’s	webpages	in	individual	countries.
33	 Lidl	to	invest	9	billion	in	Czech,	5	December	2015;	http://www.internationalsupermarket-
news.com/news/21306
34	 Romania,	fourth	market	in	the	region	for	Lidl	based	on	sales,	11	September	2015;	http://www.
romania-insider.com/romania-fourth-market-region-lidl-sales/155357/
35	 Since	2012	a	law	has	been	in	force	in	Hungary	(the	so-called	Plaza-Stop	law)	requiring	a	per-
mit	for	the	construction	of	any	store	greater	than	400	m²	in	area.
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57%	to	67%.	In	Lidl	stores	only	19%	of	the	products	came	from	Slovakia36.	As	a	re-
sult,	the	Slovak	government	introduced	new	regulations	concerning	the	relations	
between	 foreign	retail	networks	and	suppliers.	All	 additional	 fees	paid	by	pro-
ducers	of	goods	for	displaying	their	goods	on	the	shelves	were	waived;	the	sale	of	
food	products	below	the	cost	of	production	was	prohibited	(apart	from	a	few	ex-
ceptions);	the	period	within	which	suppliers	are	required	to	guarantee	the	retail	
networks	a	fixed	price	for	their	goods	was	limited	to	three	months;	and	payment	
deadlines	to	suppliers	were	reduced	to	45	days37.	Very	similar	provisions	were	in-
troduced	by	the	Czech	government,	which	also	limited	the	payment	deadlines	to	
suppliers	(to	30	days),	banned	the	sale	of	food	products	below	the	cost	of	produc-
tion,	and	imposed	new	responsibilities	on	the	foreign	retail	networks	related	to	the	
issue	of	costs	and	display	of	products	in	shops38.	Against	this	background,	Poland	
stands	out	from	the	rest	of	the	V4	countries,	as	there	the	rules	governing	relations	
between	the	foreign	retail	networks	and	the	suppliers	are	definitely	milder.	One	
of	the	few	regulations	restricting	abuse	on	the	part	of	the	retail	networks	was	the	
introduction	in	2013	of	an	obligation	to	settle	payment	for	delivery	within	30	days	
or	pay	statutory	interest	for	exceeding	the	time	limit.
In	spite	of	the	restrictions	imposed	on	the	retail	trade	in	the	Czech	Republic,	
Slovakia	and	Hungary,	none	of	the	commercial	networks	has	withdrawn	from	
those	countries.	The	attractiveness	of	the	region	has	also	been	confirmed	by	
Lidl,	which	in	2014	announced	significant	rises	in	expenditure	on	investments	
in	all	four	of	the	V4	countries.	
In	recent	years	controversy	was	aroused	by	a	report	about	the	support	provid-
ed	to	the	Schwarz	group	by	the	European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Devel-
opment39.	The	company	allegedly	receive	US$900	million	of	public	support,	in	
the	form	of	low-interest	long-term	loans	for	expansion	in	Central	Europe.	Bank	
justified	this	support	by	a	desire	to	create	jobs	and	outlets	for	local	producers,	
as	well	as	offering	high-quality	products	for	consumers.
36	 Vertrieb	und	Handelsvertretersuche-Slowakei,	2016;	https://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Naviga-
tion/DE/Trade/Maerkte/Geschaeftspraxis/vertrieb-und-handelsvertretersuche,	
t=vertrieb-und-handelsvertretersuche-slowakei,	did=1399410.
37	 Ibid.
38	 Vertrieb	und	Handelsvertretersuche:	Tschechische	Republik,	2012;	https://www.halle.ihk.
de/blob/halihk24/international/Aktuelles/downloads/626060/3844a27061455b2aa527243
4e5985248/Vertrieb_und_Handelsvertretersuche_Tschechien_gtai-data.pdf,	p.	5.
39	 Lidl	has	received	almost	$1bn	in	public	development	funding,	Guardian,	2	June	2015;	http://
www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/02/lidl-1bn-public-development-funding-super-
market-world-bank-eastern-europe
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Table 5.	The	number	of	shops	and	employment	figures	in	individual	branches	
of	Metro	AG	
country number of shops employment (thousands)
germany 951 87
Italy 166 10
russia 136 23
poland 112 11
spain 109 8
france 93 8
china 78 12
Turkey 67 7
romania 36 6
hungary 34 4
ukraine 33 4
czech republic 13 3
slovakia 6 1
source:	http://www.metrogroup.de
For	the	Metro	AG	group,	Central	Europe	is	a	market	of	similar	importance	as	
it	is	for	the	Schwarz	group.	In	the	V4	countries,	Metro	owns	8%	of	the	shops	
and	employs	8%	of	the	workers.	The	group’s	involvement	in	the	region	has	de-
creased	in	recent	years,	after	it	sold	its	hypermarkets,	in	Poland	among	oth-
ers,	to	Auchan.	Stable	growth	prospects	in	Central	Europe	were	important	for	
Metro	as	it	stabilized	its	results,	which	in	recent	years	have	been	strongly	im-
pacted	negatively	by	the	situation	in	Greece,	Russia	and	Ukraine.	
Table 6.	The	number	of	Rossmann	shops	in	individual	countries
country number of shops
germany 1930
poland 1000
czech republic 124
hungary 180
Turkey 50
albania 8
source:	http://www.rossmann.de
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Rossmann	 is	 a	 different	 case	 from	 the	 previously	 analysed	 companies,	 be-
cause	its	foreign	expansion	has	focused	almost	exclusively	on	Central	Europe.	
The	company	has	a	turnover	of	€7.9	billion,	26%	of	which	was	mainly	 in	the	
Czech	Republic,	Poland	and	Hungary.	Given	that	96%	of	its	shops	abroad	were	
branches	located	in	the	V4	countries,	provision	should	be	made	that	they	gen-
erate	almost	€2	billion	in	sales.	Foreign	sales	grew	at	a	rate	of	14%,	which	was	
twice	as	high	as	growth	in	Germany.	Rossmann	employs	about	17,500	workers	
(37%	of	all	employees)	in	the	V4	states.	
6. The banking sector
The	German	banking	sector	decided	not	 to	participate	 substantially	 in	Cen-
tral	Europe	in	the	1990s;	and	this	situation	has	not	changed	since	the	V4	coun-
tries	joined	the	EU.	The	dominant	shareholders	in	banks	in	Central	Europe	are	
investors	 from	Austria,	 Belgium	 and	 Italy.	 Overall,	 foreign	 banks	maintain	
a	dominant	market	position	in	all	the	V4	countries;	they	own	almost	100%	of	
assets	 in	Slovakia,	 87%	of	 assets	 in	Hungary,	82%	of	 the	assets	 in	 the	Czech	
Republic	and	62%	of	assets	 in	Poland40.	Only	small	 shares	of	 the	V4	markets	
have	gone	to	Germany:	about	10%	in	Poland,	9%	in	Hungary	and	around	5%	in	
Slovakia41.	For	major	German	banks,	however,	the	Polish	market	seems	to	be	
an	especially	important	division	on	the	global	scale.
The	biggest	German	bank,	Deutsche	Bank,	has	161	foreign	affiliates	in	Poland	
(the	most	in	the	world	after	Italy	and	Spain)42.	Poland	is	thus	one	of	its	key	mar-
kets	for	traditional	banking	activities,	especially	in	the	field	of	mortgage	and	
corporate	lending,	as	well	as	in	financial	advice.
Poland	is	also	in	fifth	place	globally	in	terms	of	the	value	of	loans	granted	(after	
the	Netherlands,	the	UK,	the	USA	and	China).	Moreover,	Poland	has	been	a	mar-
ket	in	credit	expansion	for	Deutsche	Bank	in	recent	years,	when	DB	reduced	the	
value	of	loans	granted	in	a	number	of	euro-zone	countries,	such	as	Spain,	Italy	
and	Portugal,	as	well	as	in	other	countries	of	the	world,	such	as	India.
40	 The	CEE	Banking	Sector	Report,	May	2014;	http://www.rbinternational.com/eBusiness/ser-
vices/resources/media/829189266947841370-on-988671613168380133-1	UR-2-EN.pdf
41	 The	CEE	Banking	Sector	Report,	June	2015;	http://www.rbinternational.com/eBusiness/01_
template1/829189266947841370-829189148030934104-1079368060623981396-NA-2-EN.html
42	 Deutsche	Bank	Geschäftsbericht,	2013;	https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/DE/Down-
loads/Veroeffent lichungen/Geschaeftsberichte/2013_geschaeftsbericht.pdf ?__
blob=publicationFile
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Table 7.	Financial	data	(in	€	million)	and	employment	in	the	various	branches	
of	Commerzbank
country revenue profit before taxes Taxes employment
germany 7392 616 221 38,078
poland 984 441 85 7747
united Kingdom 938 385 19 1369
luxembourg 392 307 12 556
usa 222 127 51 460
china 109 61 7 231
singapore 100 38 -4 342
russia 67 49 10 144
netherlands 38 29 5 40
france 40 17 11 86
other 249 85 18 807
source:	Commerzbank	Geschäftsbericht	2014;	https://www.commerzbank.com/media/aktionaere/se-
rvice/archive/konzern/2015_2/00_CAA_Geschaeftsbericht_2014_Konzern_DE.pdf
Poland	is	a	key	market	for	Commerzbank,	second	only	to	Germany.	It	is	worth	
mentioning	 that	 this	 financial	 institution	 is	 15%	 controlled	 by	 the	 German	
state,	which	 in	2009	purchased	a	part	of	 the	 shares	 in	 the	 company	 to	 save	
them	from	losing	 liquidity.	Commerzbank	has	222	branches	in	Poland,	26	 in	
the	Czech	Republic,	9	in	Slovakia	and	7	in	Hungary43.	mBank,	a	branch	of	Com-
merzbank,	is	the	third	largest	bank	in	Poland;	it	supports	36.4%	total	clients	of	
Commerzbank(4	million	private	customers	 in	Poland,	compared	to	about	3.2	
million	in	Germany)	and	employs	19%	of	all	Commerzbank	employees	(7700,	
compared	to	38,000	in	Germany).	The	company	operates	on	the	Polish	market	
under	the	brand	name	of	mBank.	In	2014	the	branch	in	Poland	brought	Com-
merzbank	€440	million	of	profits,	when	its	market	in	Germany	generated	€616	
million	in	profit.	In	its	reports	the	bank	stresses	that	the	market	situation	in	
Poland	has	been	better	in	recent	years	than	in	the	euro-zone.	Despite	this,	the	
bank	has	most	recently	implemented	austerity	measures	in	order	to	increase	
the	scale	of	its	profits	on	the	Polish	market.	The	business	model	it	has	operated	
in	Poland	has	been	copied	to	the	Czech	and	Slovak	markets,	where	branches	of	
mBank	have	also	been	opened,	but	the	activity	in	those	countries	still	consti-
tutes	only	a	small	part	of	the	bank’s	activity.
43	 The	 CEE	 Banking	 Sector	 Report,	 June	 2015;	 http://www.rbinternational.com/eBusiness/01_
template1/829189266947841370-829189148030934104-1079368060623981396-NA-2-EN.html,	p.	55.
